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INTRODUCTION
LL treaties, akin to contracts between nations, formalize the prom-
ises of their parties.1 Yet the contents of those promises differ, with 
important consequences.2 One particular difference is underappreciated 
and divides treaties into two fundamentally different categories. In one 
category of treaty, nations agree that they themselves will act, or refrain 
from acting, in certain ways.3 For convenience, I call these “resolution” 
treaties because they demand that states resolve to act. In the second cat-
egory, nations make promises they can only keep if nonstate third parties 
also act or refrain from acting.4 These are what I term “persuasion” trea-
ties because they require states to persuade third parties to do something 
differently, through regulatory or other means. Significantly, each type 
1 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (establishing that treaties 
create obligations only on consenting state parties); see also The Head Money Cases, 112 
U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations.”); Fos-
ter v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“A treaty is in its nature a contract between 
two nations . . . . [It] is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective par-
ties to the instrument.”). See generally Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Le-
viathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law (2006) (proposing that 
insights from contract theory illuminate how and when international law is made and en-
forced).  
2 See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 
581 (2005) [hereinafter Raustiala, Form and Substance] (analyzing the relationship between 
different types of treaty commitment—differences include whether the agreement is binding 
or nonbinding, whether the agreement gives jurisdiction to any institution to monitor or en-
force compliance, and to whom rights of enforcement are afforded). 
3 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 
June 26, 1987). In the United States, complications arise from constitutional separation-of-
powers and federalism constraints. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–06 
(2008) (considering whether the State of Texas was bound by a judgment of the International 
Court of Justice). Nevertheless, for many resolution treaties, the conduct the treaty antici-
pates is largely within executive branch power. 
4 For example, under the terms of the Montreal Protocol, signatory states comply only 
when they reduce certain emissions to benchmark levels. See Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, 31–33 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). In order to meet their 
international commitments under the Protocol, states must successfully ensure that private 
entities within their borders reduce emissions. Environmental treaties serve as a leading ex-
ample of persuasion treaties, though persuasion treaties are not limited to the environmental 
arena. 
A
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of treaty carries a unique set of execution and compliance problems. 
Persuasion treaties are both distinctly important and distinctly chal-
lenged. Identifying the difference between these types of treaty com-
mitment provides conceptual clarity that organizes treaty critiques, clari-
fies conditions for treaty success, and helps resolve critical persuasion 
treaty pathologies. 
There is a pressing need for a new approach to treaty problems. In vi-
tal areas such as international environmental law, we are failing to con-
clude effective treaties, and the treaties we do conclude fail to garner 
compliance.5 For example, diplomats from nearly two hundred countries 
gathered in Durban, South Africa in November 2011 to renew climate 
change commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and start designing a 
Kyoto successor.6 But they accomplished almost nothing.7 The headlines 
out of Durban reported not the agreement but the mess: sleepless nights, 
heated debates, and minute gains.8 Ultimately, treaty parties simply 
“kicked the can down the road,” producing only a tepid agreement to 
agree in the future.9
Responding to recent treaty failures, the literature asks whether, in a 
world in which the private sector wields substantial global influence, the 
traditional state-based tools of international law are adequate to coordi-
nate global conduct.10 To put this another way, how can agreements be-
5 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Govern-
ance: A Case of the G20, 12 Chi. J. Int’l L. 491, 497 & nn.13–14, 498 & nn.15–17 (2012) 
(collecting literature on multilateral treaty failures and identifying why treaties are ineffec-
tive at coordinating global financial regulations). 
6 The Durban talks constituted a Conference of the Parties to the 1992 U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Q&A with UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christina Figueres: The UNFCCC and 
the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/fact_sheets/application/pdf/expectations_for_cop17.pdf [herein-
after Figueres Q&A]. 
7 For further discussion, see infra Section I.A. 
8 See Editorial, Beyond Durban, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2011, at A24.  
9 Id.; see also Kristin Choo, Washed Away: As Sea Levels Rise, Island Nations Look to 
the Law to Fend off Extinction, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 2012, available at http://www.abajournal. 
com/magazine/article/washed_away_as_sea_levels_rise_island_nations_look_to_the_law
(noting that, according to Professor Michael Gerrard, the Durban talks “kicked the can down 
the road” even though, “for some of the island nations, there is no road left”).  
10 See, e.g., Cho & Kelly, supra note 5, at 497 (critiquing treaties as an ineffective way to 
coordinate global regulation); Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate 
Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 411, 422–
24 (2005) (examining significant private business roles in global governance); Sean D. Mur-
phy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 Colum. J. 
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tween national governments effectively govern a vast and empowered 
private business sector?11 This critique—which I label the “privatiza-
tion” critique—arises out of two connected developments: first, multi-
lateral treaty failures, and second, the emergence of transnational regula-
tory networks that seemingly replace the regulatory role treaties once 
played.12 At the same time, even the treaty critics often acknowledge 
that treaties are indispensable.13 Treaties facilitate international coordi-
Transnat’l L. 389, 392–95 (2005) (noting that “in an ideal world” governments might—on 
the prompting of civil society groups—issue more stringent regulations to control the behav-
ior of multinational corporations, but in the actual world civil society groups often do not 
press for these more stringent regulations; moreover, some governments are “unwilling or 
unable” effectively to constrain multinational corporations through regulation). 
11 See Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations under Interna-
tional Law, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 927, 930 (2005) [hereafter Vázquez, Direct vs. Indi-
rect Obligations] (noting the “general rule” that international law obligations rest on states 
and international organizations alone; to the extent that international law governs corporate 
or other private behavior, it does so by requiring states to regulate those nonstate actors). 
12 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 501 (2009) (describing and advocating a transnationally linked and voluntarily 
promulgated system of regulatory norms); Cho & Kelly, supra note 5, at 497 (advocating 
regulatory networks supervised by the G20); Robert V. Percival, Global Law and the Envi-
ronment, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 579, 582, 633–34 (2011) (recommending a focus on “global 
law,” which encompasses various governmental and nongovernmental methods of enhancing 
the transparency of multinational corporate acts). In fact, Professor José Alvarez characteriz-
es as a central assumption of liberal theory the proposal “that the future of effective interna-
tional regulation lies not with traditional treaties . . . but with transnational networks of gov-
ernment regulators.” Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal Law: Comment, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 
Proc. 249, 251 (2000) [hereinafter Alvarez, Interliberal Law]. Professor Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, one of the pioneers of this work, asserts that “law that has a direct impact on individuals 
and groups”—such as private voluntary agreements, transgovernmental agreements, or what 
Slaughter terms “traditional transnational law”—“will . . . have the greatest impact on inter-
national order” and be “more likely to get at the root of the problem” than traditional public 
international law. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 240, 245–46 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, A Liberal Theory]. A 
separate literature also notes the “vast increase in the reach and forms of transgovernmental 
regulation” and other forms of transnational governance that might be characterized as “ad-
ministrative,” and analyzes these forms of coordination under the rubric of “global adminis-
trative law.” See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15, 15, 42 (2005) (outlining the the-
ory and collecting literature).  
13 See, e.g., Slaughter, A Liberal Theory, supra note 12, at 243 (“Although much of the 
literature on this growing body of rules and norms treats them as entirely ‘private,’ the state 
is never far away.”); see also Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 614 (“[E]ven a 
networked world will require explicit agreements.”); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 291, 317 (2006) (noting that due to globalization and 
the increasing interdependence of states, many modern problems cannot be solved in a pure-
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nation, have important signaling functions, and, crucially, play a struc-
tural role within which nontreaty mechanisms are successful.14 In short, 
because we cannot do without treaties in this regulatory realm—either 
conceptually or practically15—we need new means of understanding and 
curing their failures. 
This Article seeks to unearth the execution and compliance problems 
that drive the privatization critique, analyze the nature of those prob-
lems, and identify means of ameliorating them. I propose that the an-
swers turn on identifying and understanding the class of treaties to 
which the problems inhere. 
“Persuasion” treaties anticipate domestic implementation through 
regulation of private actors.16 Of course, governments sign these treaties, 
and governments are responsible for compliance with them.17 But per-
suasion treaties demand changes in private-sector conduct. In contrast, 
ly consensual system and require formal international agreement, “rules that require strict 
compliance,” and mechanisms to influence the conduct of outlier states). 
14 For further discussion, see infra Section I.A.  
15 See Alvarez, Interliberal Law, supra note 12 (“There is no sign that states are entering 
into fewer formal treaties,” and “the age of intergovernmental institutions aspiring to univer-
sal participation is not past.”); see also Scott Barrett, Rethinking Global Climate Change 
Governance, 3 Econ.: Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-J., no. 5, 2009, at 2 (stating that 
international coordination will be needed to address the climate change problem and, “to de-
ter free riding and prevent leakage,” that coordination should be formalized as a treaty or 
“system of treaties”); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 
841, 896–97 (2006) (advocating, on the basis of an “Irreversible Harm Precautionary Princi-
ple,” a global agreement that would cap and then steadily reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
16 The distinction this Article introduces does not relate to a treaty’s execution status. In 
other words, persuasion treaties can be self-executing or non-self-executing. In the United 
States, the distinction depends upon whether the United States has existing regulatory tools 
to accomplish the ends the treaty anticipates. See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role 
of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Trea-
ties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 515, 516 (1991) (stating that self-executing treaties are “treated as 
directly effective and immediately applicable in private lawsuits or otherwise,” whereas non-
self-executing treaties “require implementing action by the political branches of government 
or . . . are otherwise unsuitable for judicial application”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four 
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, 
Four Doctrines] (analyzing U.S. law on treaty execution status). In other constitutional sys-
tems, the rules regarding self-execution vary. For a helpful comparative study, see Duncan 
B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice, in National Treaty Law and 
Practice 1, 3 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005).  
17 See sources cited supra note 1. While treaty obligations bind state parties, sometimes 
international organizations and other third parties also play a role in treaty drafting, ratifica-
tion, or enforcement. See José E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations 
as Lawmakers, 31 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 591, 591–92 (2008) [hereinafter Alvarez, Gov-
erning the World].  
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treaties concerning principally governmental conduct are not as depend-
ent on private-sector cooperation. For convenience, I call these latter 
treaties “resolution treaties.”18 Persuasion treaties deserve special atten-
tion because they are increasingly necessary to solve emerging global 
coordination problems, and the relationship between private and public 
entities with respect to persuasion treaties is particularly complex. 
I use the term “persuasion” to draw attention to the nature of that 
complex public/private relationship. In short, in order for states rational-
ly to enter into a treaty that concerns principally private conduct—and 
for such a treaty ultimately to succeed—the state must be able to secure 
the compliance and cooperation of those private-sector entities whose 
conduct the treaty seeks to control.19 To regulate effectively, a govern-
18 Resolution treaties may reach private conduct under limited exceptions, such as when 
private actors act on behalf of the state and those private acts are attributed to the state. See 
Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations, supra note 11, at 932–34. Moreover, a growing lit-
erature addresses the question whether private corporate entities may be held directly ac-
countable for violations of human rights laws. See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Business and 
Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 819, 820, 824 (2007) 
(evaluating and critiquing attempts by the international community to engage business on 
human rights issues; one draft set of norms both acknowledges that “states are the primary 
duty bearers in relation to human rights,” and stipulates that private business entities “within 
their ‘spheres of activity and influence,’ have corresponding legal duties”); see also Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel 
-v-royal-dutch-petroleum (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (collecting commentary, analysis, 
and briefing related to a pending U.S. Supreme Court case that considers, inter alia, 
whether corporations may be held liable under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of 
international law); U.N. News Centre, U.N. Human Rights Council Endorses Principles 
to Ensure Businesses Respect Human Rights, Jun. 16, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38742 (endorsing the Guiding Principles 
for Business and Human Rights, developed by Professor Ruggie, which outlines how states 
and business entities share responsibility for protecting human rights). But see Vázquez, Di-
rect vs. Indirect Obligations, supra note 11, at 933–34 (noting the very limited nature of di-
rect corporate accountability under international law). Finally, treaties can be evaluated pro-
vision by provision, and, like treaties that are partially self-executing and partially non-self-
executing, or treaties that are partially binding and partially nonbinding, treaties may fall at 
all points on a persuasion/resolution continuum.  
19 This conclusion assumes that a state’s capacity to comply with its commitments will 
have some bearing on the state’s decision whether to commit to a multilateral treaty, but it 
does not assume that a state’s decision to commit will precisely correlate with ultimate com-
pliance. The assumption is thus weaker than that asserted by Professors Abram Chayes and 
Antonia Handler Chayes. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 3–9 (1995) (proposing that 
states are generally inclined to comply with their international agreements; a state will not 
tend to enter into an agreement with which it does not anticipate the capacity to comply). 
There is, of course, a longstanding debate in the literature regarding whether and how inter-
national law constrains state behavior. For significant recent contributions, see Thomas M. 
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ment must secure tacit acquiescence from its regulatory subjects through 
an effective threat of enforcement or other means.20 Unless the relevant 
business entities have been successfully persuaded to comply, either 
there will be no treaty, or any treaty that is concluded will fail. 
To be sure, the state does not always bear the burden of persuasion. In 
some cases, industry interests will coincide with treaty requirements 
naturally. This is likely to be rare, however, as it is reducing negative 
consequences of unfettered industry that is often the object of the treaty 
in the first place. In other cases, actions by foreign or nongovernmental 
entities can serve to align business support behind treaty ends. In any 
case, the important fact is that persuasion treaty success requires that by 
some means the relevant business entities become willing to cooperate 
with treaty goals. 
The persuasion treaty theory builds upon, and contributes to, a grow-
ing literature on the interaction between public and private sources of 
Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 7–9 (1995) (states will comply with 
regimes they perceive to be legitimate); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of 
International Law (2005) (analyzing compliance through rational choice theory and propos-
ing that states comply with international law only for instrumental reasons); Andrew T. 
Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1823, 1825 
(2002) (noting that states comply to preserve reputations and avoid informal and formal 
sanctions); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 
38 Harv. Int’l L.J. 487, 500 (1997) [hereinafter Keohane, Two Optics] (reasoning that insti-
tutions facilitate compliance with international law by shaping reputations); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?] (reviewing Chayes & Chayes, supra, and Franck, supra) 
(arguing that compliance arises from internalization of legal norms). 
20 As any driver who has exceeded the speed limit on the highway knows, the existence of 
regulation does not in itself ensure compliance. The problem of whether rules that are not 
obeyed without enforcement are in fact legal rules will be familiar to those versed in late 
twentieth-century legal philosophy. See generally H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 6–7 
(2d ed. 1994) (distinguishing law and legal systems from a gunman’s threats; law persists 
through time, while the gunman’s threats have force only as long as the weapon is drawn); 
Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal 
Theory, at xvii (2001) (noting debates over the role of incorporation in legal authority; that 
is, the idea that law acquires legal force when law’s subjects incorporate it as a reason for 
action); Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 80–84 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990) (1975) 
(stating that, according to the “normal justification thesis,” law is authoritative only if sub-
jects adopt its ordering of reasons for behavior). This Article sets aside the question whether 
noninternalized rules have the force of law, adopting the assumption that the mere existence 
of regulatory rules is insufficient to ensure compliance unless regulatory subjects internalize 
those rules.  
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power in the domestic sphere.21 That literature seeks to understand the 
ways corporations become deeply enmeshed in the process of regulating. 
The scholarship shows that corporations and industry groups possess 
expertise, political power, and enforcement capital upon which regulato-
ry regimes depend.22 Deep interdependence between public and private 
actors “shatters the notion of ‘public’ power.”23 Regulation is not exclu-
sively top-down.24 Rather, the public and private sectors negotiate their 
relationships, and the nature of that negotiation determines the content 
and success of regulatory goals.25
I submit that the nature of those domestic regulatory negotiations de-
termines the success or failure of multilateral treaty regimes. Private-
sector choices, either to cooperate with or to impede domestic regulatory 
regimes, are significant on the international stage. Business choices af-
fect whether a state will be able to comply with its treaty obligations and 
also whether a state may rationally sign on to those obligations in the 
first place.26 Persuasion treaty regimes that do not garner the support of 
relevant private-sector entities will fail, either ex ante (because they will 
not secure international agreement) or ex post (because they will not 
achieve results). Conversely, persuasion treaty success depends on 
whether private-sector entities align their interests with treaty goals.27
21 See, e.g., Danielsen, supra note 10, at 411 (tracing the corporate role in transnational 
governance); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 
547 (2000) (noting the “deep interdependence among public and private actors in accom-
plishing the business of governance”); Lesley K. McAllister, Co-Regulation in Mexican En-
vironmental Law, 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 181, 181 (2012) (asserting that while public/private 
co-regulation has become commonplace in industrialized countries, it is now also emerging 
in response to regulatory shortcomings in developing countries). 
22 See Danielsen, supra note 10, at 412; Freeman, supra note 21 (“Private participation in 
governance is neither marginal nor restricted to the implementation of rules and regulations.” 
Rather, the private role is “pervasive[]” and “operates symbiotically with public authority.” 
Private actors “perform ‘legislative’ and ‘adjudicative’ roles, along with many others, in a 
broad variety of regulatory contexts. They set standards, provide services, and deliver bene-
fits. In addition, they help implement, monitor, and enforce compliance with regulations. 
Nongovernmental organizations exert, in the context of a larger network of relationships, 
coercive power.”).  
23 Freeman, supra note 21. 
24 See id. at 547–48. 
25 See id. at 548. 
26 Again, this conclusion does not assume that states will only sign on to treaties with 
which they intend to comply, but it does assume that capacity to comply may inform will-
ingness to commit. See sources cited supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
27 For an example of persuasion treaty success, see infra Part III, which examines circum-
stances surrounding the signing of the Montreal Protocol and its ultimate success.  
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Clarifying the nature of these problems guides our analysis of possi-
ble solutions. Corporate opposition might be overcome through incre-
mental regulatory migration and networking. Treaty designers should 
seek to capitalize on regulatory network successes, and states should de-
sign regulatory regimes that are exportable. Advocates should seek to 
neutralize resistance by putting corporate choices in the public eye. 
Transnational litigation, corporate responsibility measures, and public 
information campaigns all may have a role.28
Part I outlines the privatization critique and explains why it merits our 
attention; Part II constructs and defends the persuasion treaty theory; 
Part III illustrates the theory with preliminary empirical support; and 
Part IV shows how the theory frames problems and identifies possible 
solutions. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Demise of the “Grand Bargain” 
“Are big international climate conferences useless?” So the Washing-
ton Post editorial board queried in December 2011 after such a confer-
ence in Durban, South Africa.29 In the press, as in the academic litera-
ture, treaties are under siege. 
For anyone interested in addressing climate change through the multi-
lateral treaty process, the Durban conference presented a fleeting oppor-
tunity: the last chance to extend Kyoto Protocol commitments before 
Kyoto’s expiration in 2012 and an important chance to begin crafting a 
Kyoto successor.30 Durban was instead chaotic and all but fruitless. Af-
ter harried negotiations “marked by exhaustion and explosions of tem-
per,” where Canada pulled out of Kyoto altogether, and negotiators ex-
perienced all-nighters and days of overtime,31 the conference offered few 
28 See discussion infra Part IV. 
29 Editorial, Haze in the Forecast, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2011, at A30 [hereinafter Editorial, 
Wash. Post]. Others opined that a big multilateral agreement is not the place to look for pro-
gress on the climate front. See Editorial, Beyond Durban, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2011, at A24 
[hereinafter Editorial, N.Y. Times].  
30 More precisely, all existing commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions un-
der the Kyoto Protocol expired in 2012. See United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol (2012), available at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. The Kyoto Protocol is the world’s only le-
gally binding agreement on climate change. See Figueres Q&A, supra note 6, at 2. 
31 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Climate Talks Yield Limited Agreement to Work Toward 
Replacing Kyoto Protocol, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2011, at A9; Geoffrey Lean, Climate 
Change Conference: Durban Deal Gives the World a Chance, Telegraph, Dec. 12, 2011, 
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results: a tepid agreement to agree in some areas and, in others, “an 
‘agreement’ Europe has made with itself.”32
After Durban, the press expressed what many onlookers were likely 
thinking: the multilateral treaty process is ineffective and out of touch 
with reality.33 As a New York Times editorial put it, “Startling new evi-
dence that global carbon dioxide emissions are rising faster than ever did 
little to increase the urgency. . . . Once again, the world’s negotiators 
kicked the can down the road.”34 For real progress on climate change, 
the Times editorial board observed, the world “cannot keep waiting for a 
grand bargain.”35
A growing body of academic literature echoes the critique in the 
press. For example, a recent piece by Professors Sungjoon Cho and 
Claire R. Kelly critiques treaties on the ground that the process of con-
cluding them demands extensive negotiation among parties, who are be-
set by lobbies from private entities and groups as they work to finalize 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8950144/Climate-change-
conference-Durban-deal-gives-the-world-a-chance.html (discussing a “third consecutive all-
night session” and noting that the conference ended thirty-six hours late). 
32 Editorial, Global Warming Wash Out, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 2011, at A20 [hereinafter 
Editorial, Wall St. J.] (justifying the characterization by the facts that the United States never 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol in the first place, Canada did not join the Durban agreement—
instead it withdrew from Kyoto entirely—Russia and Japan did not agree to the Durban ex-
tensions, and “Australia is wavering”). As for the substance of the agreement to agree, con-
ference parties agreed simply to establish a legal instrument of some sort by 2015 and to im-
plement it by 2020. Id.; see also Broder, supra note 31 (quoting Council on Foreign 
Relations fellow Michael Levi as saying that “[t]he reality is that there is no more agreement 
on the future of the climate talks than there was when negotiators first convened two weeks 
ago”). Not everyone shares such a pessimistic view of the progress at Durban. Successes that 
some champion include progress on a “green fund” to help developing countries adapt to 
climate change and an agreement by China and India to relinquish the principle of differenti-
ated responsibility that has previously allowed them to assume lesser responsibilities for 
emissions reductions. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. Times, supra note 29; see also United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban Climate Change Conference – Novem-
ber/December 2011, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/meeting/6245. 
php (celebrating progress at Durban as a “breakthrough on the international community’s 
response to climate change”). 
33 See, e.g., Editorial, Wall St. J., supra note 32 (“U.N.-inspired causes and conferences, 
like comets tracing highly elliptical orbits, operate on their own momentum even when far 
from the sun.”). 
34 Editorial, N.Y. Times, supra note 29; see also Editorial, Wall St. J., supra note 32 (ob-
serving that the conference in Durban “was, by common consensus, a wash out”). 
35 Editorial, N.Y. Times, supra note 29 (characterizing the meeting at Durban as “the 17th 
in a series of habitually quarrelsome and mostly unproductive gatherings” since the original 
Rio climate change conference in 1992). 
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treaty texts.36 Cho and Kelly observe that international agreement is dif-
ficult for three reasons: negotiators are alert to changing global circum-
stances and are loath to eliminate their future flexibility by making con-
crete commitments; treaties are often accompanied by reservations and 
other party-specific caveats that minimize the treaty’s effectiveness; and 
the treaty amendment process is “tortuous,” such that treaties cannot 
adapt quickly to rapidly evolving global regulatory needs.37 The authors 
propose, instead, that governments should coordinate their regulatory ef-
forts, and that, in the context of economic regulation, a centralized group 
such as the G20 might assist them in doing so.38
Cho and Kelly are not alone in their assessment of treaties. Professor 
José Alvarez characterizes as a central assumption of liberal theory the 
proposal that “the future of effective international regulation lies not 
with traditional treaties . . . but with transnational networks of govern-
ment regulators.”39 Indeed, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, a central 
thinker in liberal legal theory, has long asserted that one of the “most 
important and effective” means of global governance is not top-down 
international treaty law but “direct regulation of private actors . . . with 
deliberate transnational or global intent.”40
In addition to transnational regulatory networks, Slaughter also lauds 
the spread of “private regimes” arising from corporate codes of conduct 
or industry association norms that take on transnational effect.41 Others 
also champion voluntary law over traditional forms: Professors Kenneth 
Abbott and Duncan Snidal, for example, criticize the “persistent regula-
tory inadequacies” of treaty-based “international ‘Old Governance’” and 
encourage states and intergovernmental organizations to focus attention 
on promoting voluntary networks, which might fill governance gaps.42
The move away from treaties is both explicit and implicit. In the envi-
ronmental arena, for example, a number of scholars propose various 
36 See Cho & Kelly, supra note 5, at 497. 
37 See id. at 498. 
38 See id. at 497. 
39 Alvarez, Interliberal Law, supra note 12, at 250. 
40 Slaughter, A Liberal Theory, supra note 12, at 245. 
41 Id. at 243. In Slaughter’s conception, there are two forms of “directly” regulating law, 
and both are more effective at structuring private behavior and “get[ting] at the root of the 
problem” than public international law, which affects private conduct only through the in-
termediation of the state. Id. at 245–46. These two forms are voluntary norms with transna-
tional effect created by business and industry groups, and national regulations that reach 
across national borders to govern extraterritorially. Id. at 245–46.  
42 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 510. 
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forms of decentralized, transgovernmental, non-treaty regulatory sys-
tems and simply do not address the role of treaties in global govern-
ance.43
But the era of treaty-based governance is not over. Even those who 
are most skeptical about treaty power acknowledge that private, nonlaw 
governance mechanisms take place in the shadow of law’s influence.44
As José Alvarez observes, many of the nontraditional modes of global 
governance are “nestled within traditional treaty regimes.”45 Moreover, 
the nontraditional governance mechanisms acquire some of their legiti-
macy from those traditional treaty regimes, since treaties are usually 
products of agreements between democratically legitimate govern-
ments.46 Thus, as Professor Kal Raustiala points out, formal agreements 
will still be needed even if transgovernmental networks evolve into the 
dominant means of global coordination in the twenty-first century.47
For many reasons, climate change is an unfair example of multilateral 
treaty failures. The complexity of the problem is notorious, and the noto-
riety is well-earned.48 But climate change serves as a pointed example of 
43 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 12, at 624 (focusing on efforts to increase the transparency 
of multinational corporate actions that affect the environment); see also Abbott & Snidal, 
supra note 12, at 509–10 (advocating “Transnational New Governance,” a system of volun-
tary and soft-law transnational norms intended to compliment traditional state regulation and 
fill gaps left by treaty-based international law). 
44 See, e.g., Slaughter, A Liberal Theory, supra note 12, at 243 (“Although much of the 
literature on this growing body of rules and norms treats them as entirely ‘private,’ the state 
is never far away.”). 
45 Alvarez, Interliberal Law, supra note 12, at 250. 
46 See id. 
47 Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 614 (“[E]ven a networked world will 
require explicit agreements.”). 
48 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1159 (2009) (pointing out that draft-
ing climate change laws is “extraordinarily difficult” even after one resolves the debate as to 
whether climate change is occurring and worth addressing). Lazarus categorizes climate 
change as a “super wicked” public policy problem: first, climate change is classically “wick-
ed,” because it is characterized by “interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and con-
flicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to develop a solution”; second, it is “super” 
wicked because it presents an additional set of confounding problems including the costli-
ness of time, the fact that the global actors that caused the problem lack sufficient incentive 
to solve it, and the lack of a supranational government to coordinate lawmaking and en-
forcement. See id. at 1159–60. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given these challenges, the Kyoto 
Protocol was remarkably unsuccessful. See Barrett, supra note 15 (analyzing the Kyoto Pro-
tocol’s “enforcement deficit”); see also Scott Barrett, Towards a Better Climate Treaty, 3 
World Econ. 35, 35–36 (2002) (noting that the Kyoto Protocol is plagued by “poor incen-
tives for participation and compliance”—requiring, for example, that states bear the respon-
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the reason full international agreements are still necessary: some global 
commons problems demand nothing less.49 Among others, Professor 
Cass Sunstein argues that nothing short of a worldwide climate change 
agreement would be prudent; such agreement would be difficult to con-
struct absent a treaty.50
Moreover, treaties have coordination and standard-setting functions. 
Treaties can help prevent the “divergent convergence” of regulatory 
standards that can occur when regulations migrate.51 As some in the so-
cial science literature point out, when states adopt foreign regulatory 
standards they often modify those standards to optimize them for local 
regulatory preferences.52 While the regulatory policy may spread global-
sibility to punish their own noncompliance—and, at bottom, “is an example of how not to 
construct a treaty”); John K. Setear, Learning to Live with Losing: International Environ-
mental Law in the New Millennium, 20 Va. Envtl. L.J. 139, 141 (2001) (asserting that events 
subsequent to Kyoto’s signing revealed “a debacle of unparalleled proportions . . . the deci-
sive failure of an ambitious, laboriously negotiated, and comprehensive approach to an im-
portant international environmental problem”).  
49 See generally Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 
86 Am. J. Int’l L. 259, 282–83 (1992) (arguing that environmental commons issues require 
binding international standards, which would ideally be issued by a new U.N. institution 
possessing enforcement power); Shelton, supra note 13, at 317 (arguing that a regime with 
formal international agreements is a matter of necessity because “many modern international 
problems” cannot be resolved without them). 
50 See Sunstein, supra note 15 (discussing the “Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle,” 
under which “regulators, including those who make environmental policy, should find it 
worthwhile to invest resources to preserve flexibility for the future,” and arguing that the 
best approach to climate change is a full international agreement). 
51 Elizabeth Fisher, The ‘Perfect Storm’ of REACH: Charting Regulatory Controversy in 
the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and Globalization, 11 J. Risk Res. 541, 
555 (2008) (citing social science literature that uses the term “divergent convergence” to re-
fer to the phenomenon that regulatory reform movements often result in regulations of many 
different forms in different jurisdictions, which serves as an irritant to open markets). A ro-
bust debate focuses on the effects and normative desirability of transnational regulatory ex-
ternalization. An older literature expressed concern over the specter of the “races to the bot-
tom” that might occur as global markets opened; more recent scholarship asserts that the 
contrary is also true—some powerful regulators set regulatory standards to which global in-
dustry adapts in order to maintain market position, paving the way for similarly strict regula-
tions in diverse jurisdictions. For a review of the literature and an exploration of how the Eu-
ropean Union is able to set global regulatory standards through market-generated regulatory 
migration, see, generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2012); 
Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market 
Regulation, 55 Int’l Org. 589 (2001) (exploring political, market-based, and institutional fac-
tors that that drive harmonization of regulations across global jurisdictions). 
52 See Fisher, supra note 51, at 554–55 (noting that regulations in one jurisdiction can “act 
as catalysts for regulatory reform in other jurisdictions but the nature of that reform is de-
pendent upon the unique circumstances of that other culture”). 
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ly, the implementing regulations are often inconsistent, causing irritation 
to the free flow of markets and transnational industry.53 Multilateral trea-
ties do not necessarily standardize laws, as they often leave many im-
plementation choices open to signatory states, but they can have a stand-
ardizing influence and ease irritation.54
Multilateral agreements also set minimum standards that can prevent 
the races to the bottom, or “leakage,” that result from inconsistent regu-
latory approaches.55 Moreover, some point out that corporate responsi-
bility measures can never substitute entirely for globally coordinated 
regulation because industry will never make choices that are divorced 
entirely from profit-maximization.56
Finally, while a full defense of multilateral treaties is beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is clear that the international community has not 
abandoned them.57 If we omit multinational treaties from our normative 
53 See id. at 555 (noting that through “divergent convergence” migrating regulatory stand-
ards may cause irritation to markets).  
54 For example, in the chemicals arena, an international agreement standardizing global 
chemicals testing would ensure that a testing regime begun in one country is useful else-
where. See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper: Strategy for a Future 
Chemicals Policy, at 9, COM (2001) 88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter White Paper], 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0088:FIN: 
EN:PDF (noting the usefulness of the “globally harmonised testing methodology” developed 
under the auspices of Agenda 21 adopted by U.N. Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment at the Earth Summit in Rio).  
55 See discussion infra Section IV.A (noting California’s concerns that stringent regula-
tions in the European Union would result in “dumping” of more dangerous noncompliant 
products in California); see also Percival, supra note 12, at 599–600 (“[G]lobalization has 
not entirely halted the export of unreasonably dangerous products from developed countries 
to the developing world.”). For example, when the Canadian asbestos industry feared losing 
its U.S. market due to more stringent asbestos regulations in the United States, the Canadian 
industry trade association temporarily persuaded the World Bank to encourage increased as-
bestos use in developing countries. Id. 
56 See Neil Gunningham, Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Law and the Limits of 
Voluntarism, in The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law 476, 498 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) (finding that corporations choose to en-
gage in voluntary corporate responsibility arrangements “for essentially pragmatic reasons” 
and often justify that choice as a means to manage risk; these corporate responsibility ven-
tures are often “a calculated response to external pressures rather than an expression of any 
internal moral or philanthropic commitment”); see also James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at 
the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustaina-
bility, 165, 166–69 (2008) (identifying features of the corporate form that prevent corpora-
tions from making uneconomic choices).  
57 Alvarez, Interliberal Law, supra note 12 (stating that “[t]here is no sign that states are 
entering into fewer formal treaties” and that “the age of intergovernmental institutions aspir-
ing to universal participation is not past”). 
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vision, we have to find ways to explain the fact that our global diplomats 
are still busy about the task of constructing multilateral treaty architec-
ture, presumably because we maintain faith in the possibility of treaty 
effectiveness. Either this lawmaking activity is meaningless—
“ineffective, obsolete and inconsequential”58—or we still do give some 
credence to the treaty system. 
If we need effective and successful treaties but seem unable to make 
them, there is analytic work to be done. What are the factors that con-
tribute to and challenge multilateral treaty-making success? 
The difficulties presented at the Durban conference focus a set of in-
tuitions about lurking challenges. One set of intuitions relates to the fact 
that treaties require agreement between a large number of differently sit-
uated states. This problem, which was colorfully on display in Durban,59
receives significant and justified academic attention.60 The legal litera-
ture on treaty making and compliance is now heavily influenced by in-
ternational relations scholarship, as this Article outlines further in Sec-
tion I.D, and international relations factors also drive many existing 
critiques of treaty law.61
A second set of intuitions arises from a troubling question lingering in 
the background: if states were to construct an effective climate treaty, 
58 Stephen Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking 6 (2007) (citing Myres S. 
McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 Recueil 
des Cours 133, 162 (1953)). 
59 Indeed, official accounts of the failure of multilateral climate change agreements focus 
on political negotiations between state parties. For example, the United States justified its 
refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on the ground that the Protocol incorporated the principle 
of “common but differentiated responsibility,” leaving China, India, and other developing 
countries without any significant responsibility for emissions reductions. See Thilo Kunze-
mann, The Past and Future of the Kyoto Protocol, Allianz, Nov. 27, 2011, 
http://sustentabilidade.allianz.com.br/?131 (stating that U.S. politicians were angered by the 
fact that the Kyoto Protocol gave major economic competitors a “free ride”). Canada echoed 
these complaints when it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol at the Durban conference. See 
Canada to Withdraw from Kyoto Protocol, BBC News, Dec. 13, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16151310. The Chinese delegation at Durban 
“accused developed countries of hypocrisy,” Broder, supra note 31, and news accounts de-
cried the complications arising from too many state participants, see, e.g., Editorial, Wash. 
Post, supra note 29 (stating that the conference was weighed down by “scores of small, poor 
nations, which produce little pollution and don’t really need to be in the room”). 
60 For a review of the rich literature that bridges international legal theory and international 
relations scholarship, see Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of Interna-
tional Law and Politics (2005). 
61 See generally id.; see also Cho & Kelly, supra note 5, at 497–98 (critiquing treaties on 
the ground that it is difficult for states to agree on treaty texts). 
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would they have the domestic power to satisfy the commitments such a 
treaty would require? Is their failure to commit somehow related to lack 
of enforcement power over domestic constituencies? An accord that set 
out to attain even the targets that Kyoto set over a decade ago would 
have far-reaching impacts on private economic activity.62 Corporate ac-
tors, we know, have economic and political power. While corporate ac-
tors had no explicit negotiating power in Durban, it seems inescapable 
that those negotiations took place in the shadow of their influence.63 This 
Article proposes that we need a better account of the nature of that shad-
ow. 
B. The Privatization Critique 
The privatization critique is the observation that private entities have 
a functional role in global governance that is not fully explained by their 
legal status. This critique has its roots in observations about the rise of 
corporate power and the role of corporations within the international 
system. The critique responds to the fact that, quite simply, business is 
big.64 As Professor Philippe Sands observed a decade ago, some global 
corporations have “annual operating budgets vastly in excess of most 
states.”65 In 2010, the six largest companies on the Fortune Global 500
list had a combined dollar-value revenue that exceeded the United King-
dom’s Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).66 By comparing revenue to 
62 See Barrett, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that any agreement would require parties to 
“change their behavior substantially” and, absent full compliance, would affect business 
competitiveness).  
63 See, e.g., John H. Cushman Jr., Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 7, 1997, at 28 (describing lobbying by “powerful business interests” against the 
climate change accord). The fact that there was no corresponding uproar over Durban might 
be explained by the fact that “nobody had expected great progress from Durban” anyway. 
Editorial, N.Y. Times, supra note 29.  
64 The Democratic Leadership Council (“DLC”), a partisan research group, offered this 
observation together with some illustrative numbers. See DLC, The World’s Top 50 Econo-
mies: 44 Countries, Six Firms, July 14, 2010, http://www.dlc.org/ndol_cie5ae.html?kaid=10 
8&subid=900003&contentid=255173. 
65 See Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 527, 541 n.39 (2001) (comparing Microsoft’s annual revenue and 
operating expenses with that of nation states); see also Speth, supra note 56, at 166 (“On a 
global scale, the thousand largest corporations produce about 80 percent of the world’s out-
put.”). 
66 See DLC, supra note 64. The six firms included Walmart, Royal Dutch Shell, Exx-
onMobil, BP, Toyota, and Japan Post, and their combined dollar-value revenue was $2.34 
trillion. By contrast, the UK’s GDP was $2.22 trillion. As the DLC acknowledges, the two 
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GDP, those six companies would rank among the world’s fifty largest 
economies; moreover, almost half of the world’s one hundred largest 
economies would be private companies.67
As international law scholars predicted in the 1970s, and have recent-
ly begun to note again, economic power corresponds with other kinds of 
global influence.68 Some of this is expressed through traditional interna-
tional law mechanisms, and some of it is extra-legal. 
In the late 1990s, private entities began seeking and obtaining various 
rights to participate in international institutions, which had previously 
only been available to states.69 The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
began accepting submissions from corporations and industry groups.70
numbers were calculated by different means and thus are not as comparable as the bare 
numbers would suggest. See id. For older calculations with similar results, see Sarah Ander-
son & John Cavanagh with Thea Lee and the Institute for Policy Studies, Field Guide to the 
Global Economy 69 (rev. ed. 2005) (using data from the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators online, and Fortune magazine to find that the top 100 global economies included 
fifty-two corporations and forty-eight countries); Paul de Grauwe & Filip Camerman, How 
Big are the Big Multinational Companies?, 47 Tijdschrift voor Economie en Mgmt. 311, 
315–16 (2002), available at https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/266744/1/2002-
3_311-326p.pdf (finding that thirty-seven of the world’s largest one hundred economies are 
corporations).  
67 DLC, supra note 64 (forty-two of the one hundred largest economies would be private 
companies). 
68 After some attention in the 1970s, attention to this problem diminished, but it has 
emerged again recently among those who propose private network systems of global govern-
ance or those who seek to hold corporations directly accountable for human rights violations. 
See Ruggie, supra note 18, at 819 (“The United Nations first attempted to establish binding 
international rules to govern the activities of transnationals in the 1970s,” but after a decade 
of negotiations, the project was abandoned; more recently, “soft law” approaches have 
gained prominence.); see also Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational 
Spread of U.S. Enterprises (1971) (providing an account of the future wherein powerful mul-
tinational power would grow at the expense of state power); Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty 
at Bay: Twenty Years After, in Multinationals in the Global Political Economy 19, 19–22
(Lorraine Eden & Evan H. Potter eds., 1993) (noting that after a brief period of attention to 
the topic in the 1970s, academic attention faded); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 503–05 
(noting that industry has “vigorously resisted” regulation, whether binding or nonbinding, by 
state and international bodies). 
69 See Sands, supra note 65, at 544–47. 
70 The WTO originally did not anticipate that nonstate actors of any sort (business or oth-
erwise) would play roles in WTO processes, and negotiations between state delegates oc-
curred in private. See id. at 543–44. Then the WTO Appellate Body ruled that WTO mem-
bers could select “whomever they wished to represent them, from the government or 
outside,” which created possibilities for various members of civil society and industry 
groups to participate in WTO processes. Id. at 544–45. Soon environmental groups asked the 
WTO to consider whether it would accept amicus briefs from nonstate entities. Once the 
WTO agreed, major industry groups quickly followed suit. See id. at 545–46.  
DURKEE_BOOK 2/18/2013 3:10 PM 
80 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:63
The European Court of Human Rights also offered access to nonstate 
entities.71 In addition, hundreds of business and industry groups hold 
formal consultative status with the United Nations.72 Though corpora-
tions are not treaty-making parties, they have begun to exert substantial 
influence at treaty conventions.73
The private and corporate sectors shape law not only by participating 
in formal international lawmaking processes, but also in a whole range 
of less formal ways. Most obviously, industry representatives show keen 
interest in the outcome of multinational negotiations by lobbying nation-
al governments.74 Corporate actors also in practice “create or shape the 
content, interpretation, efficacy, or enforcement of legal regimes.”75 Pro-
fessor Dan Danielsen offers a “typology of specific modes” by which 
corporations do this:76
Sometimes corporations contribute through interpretations of or reac-
tions to a legal rule scheme. Sometimes they supply rules where none 
exist. Sometimes they shape the rule scheme through direct political or 
economic pressure on regulators. Sometimes they shape it by evading 
the rule scheme and doing business elsewhere. Sometimes, to satisfy 
other business purposes, they adopt more stringent practices than the 
applicable rules require. Sometimes they act on their own to get a 
market edge or exploit an opportunity. Sometimes they act in groups 
to create a harmonized regulatory environment or to prevent regula-
tion. These diverse forms of corporate actions and decisions are relat-
71 See id. at 546–47. 
72 See Tully, supra note 58, at 7 (stating that in 2001 approximately two hundred of the 
nonstate actors holding UN consultative status “were business or industry-related associa-
tions”). 
73 See Sands, supra note 65, at 547 (“[I]t is quite normal nowadays . . . for the negotiating 
room to be half filled with representatives of industry and NGOs, for governments to find 
themselves sitting alongside British Petroleum and Friends of the Earth.”); see also Tully, 
supra note 58, at 175–76 (describing participation by nonstate actors at treaty conventions 
and noting that at one convention “the U.S. delegation met with national industries four 
times over two weeks and hosted a bilateral event with the host government together with 
local firms”); Sands, supra note 65, at 547 n.57 (noting that 211 nongovernmental organiza-
tions had been granted observer status at the Fifth Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
74 See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 63 (describing business lobbying in connection with the 
Kyoto Protocol). 
75 Danielsen, supra note 10, at 412. 
76 Id. 
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ed to both the applicable legal rules and the acts and decisions of regu-
lators, but they are not wholly determined by them.77
These various means of corporate intervention in global governance 
have resulted in a system where, as Abbott and Snidal observe, the tradi-
tional state-based and treaty-based mechanisms of international law are 
no longer capable of controlling the global conduct of economic actors.78
Both traditional domestic regulation and international treaty law admin-
istered by international organizations are pitted directly against “evolv-
ing structures of global production.”79
In sum, what I call the “privatization” critique observes that the world 
is increasingly privatized, and private corporate entities rival states in 
exercising global power. While more traditional international relations-
influenced theories of treaty making and compliance leave the privatiza-
tion critique largely unaddressed, it substantially motivates the recent in-
terest in private and regulatory network governance models and the lib-
eral strain of international relations theory. 
C. Disaggregated Global Governance 
In part in response to the privatization critique, private and quasi-
private regulatory network models of global governance suggest engag-
ing the private sector directly. These models are either pessimistic about 
the power of treaty law to structure private behavior or simply do not 
address treaty law, focusing instead on disaggregated and non-
hierarchical means of coordinating global conduct. 
In many private network governance accounts, the state functions as a 
chaperone rather than a manager. For example, Sands observes that the 
rise of the private and corporate sector has pushed back the state’s 
sphere of sovereignty both at the domestic and international levels.80 The 
77 Id.; see also Tully, supra note 58, at 165 (noting that corporations seeking to influence 
negotiations between states “lobby governments, frame issues in economic terms, submit 
proposals, distribute position papers, organize side events and raise issues for deliberation”); 
Freeman, supra note 21, at 551–55 (cataloging private roles in domestic governance). 
78 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 504–05; see also Murphy, supra note 10, at 392–
93 (observing that governments are often “unwilling or unable” to constrain effectively mul-
tinational corporate behavior through traditional regulation).  
79 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 504–05. 
80 See Sands, supra note 65, at 541 (observing that features like “the deregulation of capital 
flows, the promotion of direct foreign investment, [and] the increase in global trade” have all 
triggered a rise of “private enterprise and ownership as a dominant feature of societal struc-
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private governance accounts respond to that diminution by focusing on 
private—often voluntary—mechanisms that engage private multination-
al entities directly, such as industry association standards, corporate so-
cial responsibility ventures, and transparency initiatives.81 Abbott and 
Snidal dub this collection of voluntary mechanisms “Transnational New 
Governance.”82 In this new governance model, private actors such as in-
dustry groups, corporations, and investor groups collaborate internation-
ally to create norms for business conduct.83 Sometimes they interact with 
traditional standard-setting entities—Non-Governmental Organizations 
(“NGOs”), states, or international institutions—but they do so on sub-
stantially “equal footing” with public entities.84
Private governance methods include private standard setting by indi-
vidual firms or industries, accountability and certification programs set 
by NGOs and designed to enlist private-sector support, and some pub-
lic/private collaborations to set and enforce regulatory norms.85 In the 
private network model, the state assists private transnational regulatory 
activity by transferring information between industry actors, assisting to 
set standards, playing a background role by threatening to regulate, and 
granting or withholding legal licenses.86 NGOs participate by publiciz-
ing private industry acts using transnational litigation, boycotts, and oth-
ture, with the emphasis increasingly on the public sector playing a residual role in a deregu-
lated society”). 
81 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 508–10; Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as 
Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 452, 453–54 (2008) (not-
ing that corporations have begun to create various mechanisms of voluntary “corporate self-
regulation” to demonstrate their sensitivity to “broader ethical considerations” and accounta-
bility to constituencies beyond shareholders); Percival, supra note 12, passim (noting the 
emergence of many forms of corporate transparency initiatives); Slaughter, A Liberal Theo-
ry, supra note 12, at 243 (same). 
82 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 509. 
83 See id. at 505–06. 
84 Id. at 506. 
85 See generally id. at 505–12 (identifying a diversity of forms of “Transnational New 
Governance”). 
86 See David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resili-
ency of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack 
Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 334, 334–35 (2011) (explaining the 
factors that motivate private industry to undertake corporate responsibility ventures); see al-
so Gunningham, supra note 56, at 476–500 (same; introducing the concept of varied “licenc-
es to operate” that inspire and motivate corporate social responsibility ventures). 
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er transparency measures to enlist public and state support for better in-
dustry practices.87
Firm and Industry Standards. Abbott and Snidal note that in the 
1980s, NGOs, in an attempt to fill “domestic and international regulato-
ry gaps,” began to encourage corporations to adopt private global gov-
ernance schemes.88 That NGO activity motivated firm and industry ac-
tors to adopt codes of conduct to govern issues of social or 
environmental import.89 Early efforts by The Body Shop and Gap led to 
a “cascade” that influenced multinational corporations in all quarters; by 
the late 1990s, corporate responsibility measures had become “de 
rigueur,” and there are now thousands of these ventures,90 which usually 
involve codes of conduct and set procedures to monitor compliance.91 In 
a related trend, multinational corporate retailers often attempt to exert 
control over their supply chains.92
NGO or Public-Private Standards. Another type of private network 
governance consists of NGO standard-setting, where NGOs set conduct 
standards and private industry voluntarily agrees to comply in order to 
receive the NGO’s stamp of approval.93 The Fairtrade Labeling Organi-
zation is among the most famous of these cooperative ventures, but other 
examples include the Alliance for Water Stewardship, the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels, and the Sustainable Tourism Stewardship Coun-
cil.94 Some of these cooperative regulatory ventures enlist state assis-
87 See, e.g., Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of Europe-
an Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 897, 920–28, 940 
(2009) (showing how NGOs took a role in the transnational spread of the REACH regula-
tions by publicizing industry use of dangerous chemicals); see also Gunningham, supra note 
56, at 488–89 (explaining how industry CSR ventures are responsive to public reputation 
factors); David B. Hunter, The Implications of Climate Change Litigation: Litigation for In-
ternational Environmental Law-Making, in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, 
and International Approaches 357, 357–74 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 
2009) (proposing that transnational litigation is a meaningful strategy to prompt public 
awareness and private accountability for climate change even if the litigation is ultimately 
unsuccessful); Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 86, at 335 (noting that reputational pressures 
contribute to development of CSR regimes). 
88 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 519. 
89 See id. at 517–19. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. at 517 n.50 (noting that these codes may also be “linked to broader corporate 
structures for addressing business ethics and stakeholder concerns” (citing Gill, supra note 
81, at 466–68)). 
92 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 517.  
93 See id. at 517–18. 
94 See id. at 518 & nn. 55–57, 519. 
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tance, for example, by incorporating state regulatory standards,95 but the 
state’s role is usually minimal. 
In transnational regulatory network accounts such as that championed 
by Slaughter, the rise of private power does not correlate with the dimi-
nution of state power in a zero-sum game; instead, private power and 
state power may develop simultaneously.96 Public and private entities 
can each check the power of the other as they each gather added force by 
networking across national borders.97 This cross-border networking at all 
levels became possible due to a “radically expanded communications 
capacity”; now various subgovernmental units—such as courts, adminis-
trative agencies, and legislative bodies—can easily coordinate approach-
es to common problems, at the same time as corporations and other pri-
vate entities form global links.98 Slaughter imagines that the 
subgovernmental transnational coordination will lead to regulatory con-
vergence and “the harmonization of national law.”99
Professor Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory directs at-
tention to the reasons why these transnational networks arise and func-
tion.100 In Koh’s account, public and private entities—including gov-
ernment officials, NGOs, “transnational moral entrepreneurs,” and 
private business entities—form “epistemic communities.”101 These 
communities interact to generate patterns of activity, which lead to the 
articulation of conduct norms that formalize those patterns; then, finally, 
95 See id. at 518. 
96 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 Foreign Aff. 183, 184
(1997) [hereinafter Slaughter, New World Order] (providing an early account of the rise of 
“disaggregat[ed]” transgovernmental regulatory networks).  
97 See id.; see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Trans-
governmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 12 (2002) 
[hereinafter Raustiala, Networks] (observing that new means of rapid travel and immediate 
contact, such as the Internet, have “progressively made long-distance communication, and 
thus networks, far easier and . . . more prevalent”). 
98 Slaughter, New World Order, supra note 96. 
99 See id. at 196. 
100 See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 19; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Trans-
national Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 183–84 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational 
Legal Process] (introducing the term “transnational legal process” to denote “the theory and 
practice of how . . . nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-
governmental organizations, and private individuals . . . make, interpret, enforce, and ulti-
mately, internalize rules of transnational law”). 
101 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 19, at 2648, 2656. 
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executive, legislative, and judicial actions serve to absorb the norms 
domestically.102
The disaggregated views are normative in that they propose that glob-
al governance by private or regulatory networks may accomplish goals 
that the current system cannot. These views do not propose that private 
governance should mature into international law, but that the private and 
regulatory networks are independent ends. For instance, Abbott and 
Snidal assert that states and intergovernmental organizations should cul-
tivate the voluntary networks because they hold at least some potential 
to “ameliorate the persistent regulatory inadequacies of international 
‘Old Governance.’”103
The disaggregated governance accounts contain useful proposals as to 
how to accomplish social goods in the interstices of traditional treaty 
law, and in arenas where it has been impossible to conclude an effective 
treaty, but they leave open the question how traditional treaty law may 
function effectively in light of those forces of globalization and privati-
zation, or how treaty law might escape the “persistent regulatory inade-
quacies” the accounts identify. 
D. International Legal Theory 
While private and regulatory network theorists address the privatiza-
tion critique by turning to nontreaty methods of global coordination, le-
gal scholars who address conditions of treaty making and compliance do 
not sufficiently address the critique’s challenges to treaties. There are 
two reasons for this omission: First, states alone are parties to treaties, 
and so corporations are structurally irrelevant to discussions of treaty 
making and compliance.104 Any private corporate responsibilities under 
102 See id. at 2656–57. In Koh’s account, transnational legal process explains how “inter-
national law acquires its ‘stickiness.’” Id. at 2655; cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How 
to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 621, 
626 (2004) (noting that international law affects state behavior through a process of “accul-
turation” in which various actors feel compelled to assimilate through interaction with other 
actors). By participating in this repeating process of “interaction, interpretation, and internal-
ization,” states begin to see compliance with international law as within their self-interest. 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 19, at 2655. In this way, “[d]omestic institu-
tions . . . enmesh international legal norms, generating self-reinforcing patterns of compli-
ance.” Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 
1935, 1961 (2002) [hereinafter Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties]. 
103 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 510. 
104 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1 (establishing that treaties 
create obligations only on consenting state parties); see also Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Ob-
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treaties are usually indirect and derivative to that of states.105 Second, the 
literature has developed in response to a different set of questions, prin-
cipally relating to whether and why, in the absence of a global sover-
eign, sovereign states will subject themselves to binding agreements.106
Borrowing fruitfully from international relations scholarship, the litera-
ture thus principally inquires how state relationships and behavior with 
respect to each other give rise to agreements, and when and why those 
agreements become effective.107 While this literature does not directly 
engage the privatization critique, the legal literature that borrows from 
liberal international relations theory provides a helpful structure to frame 
the problem. 
The leading rationalist theories include realism, institutionalism, and 
liberalism.108 Realism treats states as “rational unitary actors” and the 
ligations, supra note 11, at 930 (noting the “general rule that international law directly im-
poses obligations only on states and supra-national organizations”; insofar as international 
law governs corporate or other private behavior, it does so by requiring states to regulate 
those non-state actors); sources cited supra note 1. There are some exceptions, including cir-
cumstances in which private entities act on behalf of the state and those private acts are at-
tributed to the state. See Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations, supra note 11, at 933–34. 
105 See Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations, supra note 11.  
106 See Danielsen, supra note 10, at 411 (noting lack of attention by international law 
scholars to the role of private multinationals in global governance); see also Tully, supra 
note 58, at 5 (noting that because “[c]orporations are, by definition, national legal creatures 
conducting territorially focused commercial activities,” they are virtually ignored in interna-
tional legal theory); Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers 
and Globalization, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 435, 444 (1997) (arguing that international lawyers are 
out of touch with the forces of globalization, while a new transnational global community 
characterized by “privatization, deregulation and state minimalization” is forming); Fleur 
Johns, The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law 
and Legal Theory, 19 Melb. U. L. Rev. 893 (1994) (arguing that corporations are “invisible” 
in international legal theory). See generally sources cited supra note 19 (debating whether 
and why international law might constrain state behavior). 
107 See, e.g., Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1943 (explaining that 
the two disciplines have increasingly traded insights); Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 19, 
at 487–93 (reviewing the literature); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations 
Theory and International Economic Law, 10 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 717, 718–19 (1995) 
[hereinafter Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory] (suggesting that productive insights for interna-
tional lawyers may be gained by exploring the assumptions of international relations theory). 
108 See Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory, supra note 107, at 721–31; see also Hathaway, Hu-
man Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1944, 1955–62 (characterizing the three rationalist 
accounts as “interest-based,” unlike “norm-based” accounts such as the “managerial model” 
proposed by Chayes and Chayes, the “legitimacy” theories proposed by Thomas Franck and 
others, and Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory); Kal Raustiala, Form and Sub-
stance, supra note 2, at 582 (selecting these three international relations accounts as those 
that explain international legal choices by nation-states). With the exception of Koh’s trans-
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relevant units of analysis in the international system.109 States fundamen-
tally seek power, and must secure it in order to carry out their interna-
tional preferences.110 From the realist perspective, when states interact, 
they seek to consolidate and increase their power on the international 
stage.111 The configuration of the international system is thus the product 
of competing plays for power. According to the realists, states comply 
with international law only when that law coincides with their preexist-
ing ends; international law itself does not have coercive power.112 Inter-
national lawyers borrow from realist international relations theory the 
idea that states are the relevant units of analysis and are both the genera-
tors and subjects of international legal rules.113 Their normative and de-
scriptive accounts do not accord any relevance to either substate or non-
state actors, or to the construction of state interests at the domestic 
level.114 Although the realist critique persists in various forms,115 schol-
ars in the 1980s noted that states sometimes seem to cooperate in ways 
that classic realism could not cogently explain.116
national legal process theory, the norm-based accounts also focus on the state as the relevant 
unit of analysis, and thus do not offer a robust account of the role of nonstate actors. See 
generally Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1955–62 (reviewing the lit-
erature). 
109 Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory, supra note 107, at 722. For a classic and a revised realist 
account, compare Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (1948) (classic version), with Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(1979) (presenting a “neorealist” formulation which assumes that states are “unitary actors 
who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal 
domination”). 
110 See Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory, supra note 107, at 722–23. 
111 See id.  
112 See Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1945 (explaining that inter-
national law is “largely epiphenomenal” in the realist account). 
113 See Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory, supra note 107, at 723. 
114 See id.  
115 For a review of the evolution of the realist critique, see Oona A. Hathaway, Between 
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 
470–71, 477–83 (2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, Power and Principle] (noting that the realist 
critique gained momentum after World War II when “widespread dismay over the failure of 
earlier institutions to prevent the collapse of order prompted a wave of attacks on the Wilso-
nian ideal of an international system founded on global legal order”; responses to this cri-
tique by international lawyers have not fully satisfied realism’s “concerns about the field’s 
validity”). 
116 See Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1945–46. 
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Institutionalism seeks to explain this cooperation, specifically as it is 
on display in the rise of international institutions.117 As with realism, 
states are the relevant units of analysis.118 Institutionalism explains that 
international institutions serve coordination functions, assisting states to 
share information and pursue common ends; by doing so, these institu-
tions “ameliorate[] the conditions of conflict” that would otherwise 
thrust states into the power plays the realist account observes and pre-
dicts.119 Thus, for institutionalists, international law provides a means of 
achieving outcomes that are only possible when states coordinate their 
behavior.120 This coordination arises and becomes elaborated in regimes 
because rational, self-interested states know that coordinating their be-
havior with other states will further their interests; they then comply 
with international law “as long as the reputational costs and direct sanc-
tions that would result from noncompliance outweigh the costs of con-
tinued compliance.”121
Liberal theory “opens the black box of the state,”122 articulating the 
insight that a state’s international behavior is shaped by both its vertical 
relationships with domestic constituencies and its horizontal relation-
ships with other transnational actors.123 Liberal theory diverges from re-
alism and institutionalism in its belief that what matters most to global 
legal affairs is not the relative distribution of power (realism) or infor-
117 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in In-
ternational Relations Theory 7–16 (1989) (coining the term “neoliberal institutionalism” and 
distinguishing this from other interest-based international relations theories); Keohane, Two 
Optics, supra note 19, at 490 (explaining the institutionalist account as arising from the intui-
tion that states sometimes “forgo the short-term advantages derived from violating [those] 
rules” in order to maintain the international system (quoting Phillip R. Trimble, International 
Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 811, 833 (1990))). 
118 See Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory, supra note 107, at 726. 
119 Id. 
120 See id.; see also Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 19, at 489–91, 499–500 (explaining 
that institutions “perform valuable functions for states” by setting agendas, sharing infor-
mation between regime participants, and shaping and characterizing the presentation of is-
sues). 
121 Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1950–51 (citing Guzman, supra 
note 19); see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19 (distinguishing their approach from insti-
tutionalist accounts but nevertheless suggesting that state compliance with international law 
leads to harmonious and ultimately helpful interstate relationships); Goldsmith & Posner, 
supra note 19, at 1114–15 (using a rational choice model to provide an account of why states 
develop and comply with international law). 
122 Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102. 
123 See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 51 Int’l Org. 513, 513 (1997). 
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mation and institutions (institutionalism), but how domestic and transna-
tional constituencies construct state interests.124
Liberal theory thus provides the only rationalist account of the role of 
substate and nonstate actors in international law. States are not “mono-
lithic,” or single unitary actors.125 Instead, state interests are the products 
of domestic political processes and interactions between individuals and 
groups.126 Before bargaining on the international stage, “[s]tates first de-
fine preferences,” a process that occurs domestically, and takes place 
through political interactions between the state and its constituencies.127
Domestic constituents then use the nation-state as an instrument to ac-
complish their international goals.128
By recognizing the role of domestic politics in the construction of 
state interests, liberal theory provides a mechanism for understanding 
corporate influence with respect to international agreements. While the 
literature has not focused uniquely on corporations apart from other 
members of domestic and transnational society, the corporate place in 
the liberal account is not obscure: corporations are among the domestic 
constituencies that shape state interests, which are expressed interna-
tionally. To the extent that corporations are powerful domestic constitu-
encies, they can dominate state preferences, and shape the bargains 
states are prepared to make. Corporations also play a role in the liberal 
account as part of the international society in which states are embedded. 
Corporations network across national boundaries just like other govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors, to shape state interests by influenc-
ing domestic political systems. 
Presumably, the absence of effective multilateral treaties in given are-
as arises from an insufficient number or insufficient strength of state 
preferences to conclude and comply with such treaties. To the extent that 
corporations are dominant domestic constituencies, they may be shaping 
state preferences against treaty making in the relevant areas. The liberal 
account ends there, however, and so does not, without more, answer the 
privatization critique. Liberal theory does not assist us in determining 
124 Id. 
125 Slaughter, Liberal IR Theory, supra note 107, at 723, 727–29. See generally Moravcsik, 
supra note 123, at 544–45 (elaborating the theory).  
126 See Moravcsik, supra note 123, at 523–24. 
127 Id. at 544. 
128 See id.; see also Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 595 (offering this point 
as one of the “core assumptions” of liberal theory). 
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with sufficient granularity how the corporate-state relationship functions 
or, normatively, how to make effective treaties despite powerful corpo-
rate constituencies. Moreover, liberal theory is subject to the critique 
that it does not predict when and why states subscribe to treaties.129 To 
the extent that is true, liberal theory is also unhelpful in explaining the 
influence of private corporations on multilateral treaty making. 
The liberal account thus serves to frame the questions posed by the 
privatization critique, which still stand: How might effective multilateral 
treaties be made when corporate power is sufficient to dominate the do-
mestic politics of multiple states, and thus shape their international pref-
erences? What happens when corporations “capture” those who would 
be transgovernmental norm builders, thwart domestic regulation, and 
prevent regulatory convergence?130
* * * 
Answering the privatization critique is both a descriptive and a nor-
mative project. Descriptively, we need a treaty classification that identi-
fies those agreements to which corporate influence is most relevant. 
Normatively, we need an account that proposes the conditions under 
which treaties subject to corporate influence might be successful. We 
need a theory that both fully accounts for the significant impact of large 
transnational corporations and proposes law-based global governance—
that is, a theory that recognizes the importance of treaties. 
II. NEW TREATY TAXONOMY
Identifying the agreements to which corporate influence is relevant 
requires new treaty taxonomy. As outlined in the previous Part, the ex-
isting literature examines a variety of modes by which corporations are 
linked to multilateral treaties, including corporate lobbying of national 
129 As Professor Oona Hathaway has observed, liberal theory does little to explain why 
states might subscribe to treaties, or account for the fact that some treaties are successful and 
some are not. See Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1954–55.  
130 In our Citizens United v. FEC era, it is notable that while the power of large corporate 
interests is under scrutiny in the domestic realm, theories of the development and enforce-
ment of international law lag behind. See 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from placing limits on independent spending 
for political purposes by corporations and unions); see also Room for Debate: How Corpo-
rate Money Will Reshape Politics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2010, http://roomfordebate.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2010/01/21/how-corporate-money-will-reshape-politics/ (presenting the views 
of seven academics regarding the impact of Citizens United).  
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governments and participation in the domestic political process, corpo-
rate attendance at treaty conventions and side events, corporate engage-
ment with international bodies such as the WTO, and, specifically in the 
human rights arena, direct enforcement of treaty provisions against cor-
porations.131 Although each of these modes of interaction forms part of a 
complete account of the relationship between states, corporations, and 
international agreements, we also need an account of how, why, and for 
which treaties corporate influence might alter treaty outcomes—that is, 
whether a treaty is signed and effectively enforced. This Part provides a 
structural account. 
A. Persuasion and Resolution Treaties 
Treaties may be classified as either “persuasion” or “resolution” trea-
ties. Corporate influence will be principally relevant to the former. This 
Section, however, temporarily sets aside the question of corporate influ-
ence in order to outline the proposed distinction. The classification di-
vides treaties according to whose behavior the treaty seeks to govern.
Clearly, with some small exceptions, states alone are treaty signato-
ries.132 Moreover, with another small set of exceptions, treaties govern 
solely state behavior.133 The distinction I seek to make is this: some trea-
ties anticipate that states will regulate the conduct of private citizens, 
while others seek to alter principally state conduct. The former are what 
I call “persuasion” treaties,134 while the latter are “resolution” treaties.135
131 See Section I.B and accompanying citations. In addition, sometimes corporations pro-
actively refer to treaty provisions to justify their conduct. See Natasha Affolder, The Market 
for Treaties, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 159, 159 (2010) (noting that because private corporations face 
increasing scrutiny and seek to “define acceptable standards of environmental and social be-
havior,” they have begun to refer to treaty standards to justify their behavior). 
132 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1 (establishing that treaties cre-
ate obligations only on consenting state parties); see also sources cited supra note 1.  
133 See Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations, supra note 11, at 933–34. A growing lit-
erature addresses the question whether private corporate entities may be held directly ac-
countable for human rights laws. See Ruggie, supra note 18, at 819–20 (evaluating these ef-
forts); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, supra note 18 (collecting commentary, 
analysis, and briefing related to a pending U.S. Supreme Court case that considers, inter alia, 
whether corporations may be held liable under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of inter-
national law).  
134 Persuasion treaties are like any other treaty in that they require international agreement, 
conclusion, and entry into force. For the principal source of the law of treaties, see Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1. A state’s capacity to comply will of course 
depend upon more than its capacity to regulate effectively. For example, in the United 
States, the President must seek the advice and consent of the Senate prior to ratifying a trea-
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Persuasion treaties include, for example, treaties governing agricul-
tural sanitary standards, disposal of waste in international waters, and 
control over the manufacture and use of ozone-depleting chemicals. 
These treaties reach inward to the domestic affairs of the state’s citi-
zens.136 In order for a state to satisfy its international commitments in 
these arenas it must endeavor to persuade its citizens to maintain sani-
tary farms, its shipping companies to refrain from dumping waste inap-
propriately, and its chemical corporations not to produce and sell prohib-
ited substances. In a sense, the Kyoto Protocol is the capstone 
persuasion treaty, because to enforce it—and thus to live up to its inter-
national commitments—a signatory state must ensure that its natural and 
corporate citizens alter a whole range of behaviors in order to reduce the 
state’s total greenhouse gas emissions. 
In liberal democracies the state usually sets about to change private 
behavior through regulation. Thus, these also could be titled “regulato-
ry” treaties. I instead use the term “persuasion” because it focuses atten-
tion on the fact that the state’s ultimate goal in issuing regulations is to 
persuade private citizens to alter their conduct. Regulation is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for changing private behavior. In-
stead, regulation is a tool (granted, the most common tool) for achieving 
private acquiescence. I explore the implications of this distinction later 
in this Part. For the purposes of shorthand, however, persuasion treaties 
are treaties that anticipate domestic regulation of private actors.137
ty, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, and treaties are subject to constitutional limitations that apply to 
all exercises of federal power, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (“[N]o agreement 
with a foreign nation can confer power on Congress, or on any other branch of Government, 
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution”). See generally Louis Henkin, Foreign 
Affairs and the United States Constitution 185–88 (2d ed. 1996) (providing an account of 
how treaties gain the force of law in the United States).  
135 A note at the outset: this conceptual framework is an oversimplification. It does not ad-
dress many aspects of a state’s obligations under a treaty, and those it does address are over-
simplified. The simplicity, however, is useful: it focuses attention on the distinctive treaty 
features that are relevant to unraveling the privatization critique. Because this distinction has 
not received systematic attention, even the basic framework illuminates important treaty fea-
tures and frames existing questions. 
136 This is in a different way, however, than the “reaching inward” of human rights trea-
ties, which typically govern state behavior.  
137 Whether a treaty is classified as a persuasion treaty does not depend upon whether it is 
self-executing or non-self-executing. In the United States, persuasion treaties may be either 
self-executing or non-self-executing, depending upon whether existing U.S. legislation is 
sufficient to carry out treaty obligations. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491, 505 n.2 
(2008). “Self-executing” treaties have “automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratifi-
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In the second, and perhaps more classic, form of treaties, a state may 
comply with the treaty by resolving to do so.138 Of course, things are not 
always quite this simple. Sometimes, due to federalist or other domestic 
governance structures, states may make international obligations with 
which they cannot comply even when those commitments appear to bind 
only state actors.139 Nevertheless, resolution treaties concern the state’s 
own behavior, governing such things as alliances, borders, the conduct 
of war, conclusion of peace, and treatment of diplomats and foreign na-
tionals. A state may comply by providing instructions and guidance to 
those notionally under its control. For example, a state may comply with 
a resolution treaty by instructing its military to cease hostilities, or its 
police forces to refrain from arresting diplomatic officials. The resolu-
tion treaty may require a change in behavior (cease hostilities), or it may 
merely require maintenance of the status quo (no new tariffs). In either 
case, accomplishing the ends the treaty demands requires principally that 
the state decide, or resolve, to do so. 
All treaties require state resolve in that all treaties are contracts be-
tween state parties, entered into between states, and committing the state 
cation,” whereas “non-self-executing” treaties do not automatically create federal law that is 
enforceable domestically. Id. In the United States, a non-self-executing treaty has domestic 
effect only after Congress passes implementing legislation. See id.; see also Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (articulating the treaty execution rule: when the 
United States agrees in a treaty “to perform a particular act . . . the legislature must execute 
the contract before it can become a rule for the court”). It is the implementing legislation, 
rather than the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United States. See Medellin,
552 U.S. at 505.  
138 Though I describe resolution treaties as the “classic” form, there are certainly newer 
resolution treaties such as the Geneva Convention (civilians in wartime), the Genocide Con-
vention (state-sponsored genocide), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
139 The Medellin saga in the United States courts is a ready example. A judgment by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) required Texas to reconsider the convictions and sen-
tences of fifty-one Mexican nationals. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497–98. The Supreme 
Court, on its second review of the case, granted that under the U.N. Charter, the United 
States “undertakes to comply” with the ICJ judgment. Id. at 509 n.5. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court held that because the U.N. Charter obligation did not create self-executing law, 
and the U.S. Congress did not pass implementing legislation, the treaty did not have the 
“force and effect of domestic law sufficient” to bind Texas. See John R. Crook, Contempo-
rary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 860, 862
(2008). Texas ultimately executed Medellín despite an explicit request by the Bush admin-
istration that Texas comply with the ICJ judgment. See id. at 862–63; see also Medellin, 552 
U.S. at 530 (noting that under U.S. law, the executive cannot give domestic effect to a non-
self-executing treaty “by unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts”). For 
another example of conflict between the executive and judicial branches over treaty interpre-
tation, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
DURKEE_BOOK 2/18/2013 3:10 PM 
94 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:63
to a certain course of action. Thus, for all treaties a state must resolve to 
agree and comply. The distinction I seek to highlight is that resolution 
treaties seek to govern state actors alone, while persuasion treaties ask 
states to impose the international agreement on non-state actors as well. 
Some treaties have both persuasion and resolution elements. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) was a hybrid per-
suasion/resolution treaty, for example, particularly with respect to the 
provisions introduced in the Uruguay Round. Though the provisions in-
troduced at the Uruguay Round were principally directed to state con-
duct (elimination of tariffs), they also demanded that state parties insti-
tute agricultural sanitary measures that were directed to private conduct. 
Hybrid treaties can be evaluated provision by provision, as is the prac-
tice for treaties that are partially self-executing and partially non-self-
executing, or treaties that have both binding and nonbinding elements. 
Just as common practice refers to mostly binding agreements as “bind-
ing” and primarily nonbinding agreements as “nonbinding,” this Article 
suggests similar descriptive shorthand for the distinction between per-
suasion and resolution. Treaties might be imagined on a continuum, with 
different agreements falling at various points between the two extremes: 
Figure 1
On this continuum, the Convention Against Torture may fall far to the 
left, the Montreal Protocol far to the right, and the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT somewhere in the middle. 
After spreading treaties along the resolution/persuasion continuum, an 
additional distinction comes into focus. While the persuasion/resolution 
distinction concerns whose behavior the treaty seeks to govern, treaties 
may also be divided according to how success is measured. Signatory 
states might commit themselves to benchmarks that they must satisfy in 
order to comply with the treaty’s terms. For instance, the Montreal Pro-
tocol and the Kyoto Protocol each commit states to eliminating specified 
emissions at a certain rate. For another type of agreement, most fre-
quently managerial framework conventions, signatory states may simply 
Resolution    Persuasion 
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commit themselves to making efforts to remedy a situation. Mapping 
this distinction over the prior one provides a dual axis: 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows the degree to which a state will need to engage the 
private sector in order to attain treaty goals. Focusing just on the persua-
sion half of the graph (quadrants B and D), it is clear that not all agree-
ments are equal. More persuasive treaties with more benchmarks will 
require states to do more work to persuade citizens to comply. By con-
trast, treaties that require only a commitment of effort (quadrant D), 
such as framework conventions that express aspirational commitments 
to a certain issue, carry only minimal state obligations. 
The location of a treaty on the graph will determine which factors will 
be most significant for states seeking to negotiate and sign it. For treaties 
on the resolution side (A, C), the important factors will be principally 
those familiar to the international relations literature: consolidation of 
power, coordination and cooperation games with other states, and state 
reputation. By contrast, on the persuasion side (B, D), in addition to the 
international relations factors, a state will also have to concern itself 
with domestic relationships, potentially affected domestic constituen-
cies, and regulatory power. 
 Effort 
Resolution   Persuasion 
Benchmark 
A B
C D
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This set of treaty distinctions builds upon and contributes to our exist-
ing tools for categorizing and evaluating treaties. Familiar questions 
about the nature of international agreements include, among others, 
whether the agreement creates binding commitments, whether a treaty is 
self-executing or implemented through domestic regulations, whether it 
gives jurisdiction to any institution to monitor or enforce compliance, 
and to whom rights of enforcement are afforded.140 Raustiala suggests 
that these treaty features may be divided according to “form” and “sub-
stance.”141 Features related to treaty form include (a) legality, or whether 
a treaty is legally binding or nonbinding, and (b) structure, which relates 
to a treaty’s enforcement mechanisms.142 Substance, in Raustiala’s ac-
count, refers to the depth of a state’s commitment, which he defines as 
the extent to which an agreement requires a state to “deviat[e] from the 
status quo.”143 In other words, to what extent must a state make substan-
tial policy changes in order to carry out promises made in the agree-
ment? The deeper the agreement, the more substantial the changes a 
state must make; conversely, shallow agreements rubber-stamp existing 
state practice.144 The same treaty might be deeper for some parties and 
shallower for others, and the difference depends on the nature of state 
practice ex ante.145
The persuasion/resolution treaty distinction extends and provides a 
counterpoint to Raustiala’s analysis by identifying a different set of fea-
tures of state treaty commitments. The vertical axis I propose is similar 
to, but not coextensive with, Raustiala’s deep/shallow distinction. Raust-
iala’s “deep” commitments require that states make actual changes to 
their own or their private citizens’ conduct, whereas shallow commit-
ments require maintenance of the status quo or little more.146 Those I call 
140 See generally Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 2 (discussing these features 
and dividing them according to whether they affect what he terms the “form” or “substance” 
of an international agreement). 
141 Id.; see also id. at 581–82 (noting the dearth of analysis about how the features relate to 
each other and providing an account of that relationship). 
142 See id. at 581. Raustiala refers to binding and nonbinding agreements as “contracts” 
and “pledges,” respectively. Id. 
143 Id. at 581, 584. 
144 See id. at 584. 
145 See id. 
146 Raustiala explains that, in his analysis, trade agreements like those constituting and car-
ried out by the World Trade Organization are “deeper” because these agreements include a 
large number of very particularized rules with which states must comply. See id. at 585. 
Conversely, framework conventions, such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
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“benchmark” agreements may in many cases be deep while “effort” trea-
ties will largely be shallow. Both Raustiala’s distinction and my own 
home in on the extent to which states must alter conduct in order to 
comply with the treaty.147 They differ in that a treaty may conceivably be 
both a benchmark treaty and shallow if, at the time of signing, the state 
has already instituted regulations or otherwise persuaded its citizens to 
adopt conduct that allows the state to meet the benchmark.148
B. The Role of Persuasion 
Persuasion of domestic constituencies is a necessary condition for a 
state’s compliance with persuasion treaties. Persuasion treaties are “per-
suasive” in the sense that, to comply with them, a state must persuade its 
natural or corporate citizens to alter their behavior to accomplish the 
goals the treaty sets.149 In a way, all treaties are persuasion treaties in 
Change, exemplify “shallow” conventions because they rely on minimal commitments. See 
id.  
147 One would expect states easily to accede to agreements where the obligations are non-
binding and, in Raustiala’s terms, “shallow,” whereas treaties that are binding and “deep” 
require much more from state parties. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol was of the latter type 
and drew uneven commitments and spotty compliance.  
148 My chart also omits the binding/nonbinding distinction Raustiala identifies. That dis-
tinction could be mapped helpfully onto the dual axis by adding a third dimension:  
 Figure 3 
149 Note that treaties that require states to meet benchmarks require that the state effective-
ly persuade, while for “effort” treaties, only an attempt at domestic persuasion is necessary. 
As discussed further in the following Section, the term “persuasion” does double duty: per-
suasion treaties require domestic regulatory persuasion, and they are also often the products 
of reciprocal persuasive battles between state and nonstate parties. A persuasion treaty thus 
 Binding 
 Non-Binding
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that states are required to maintain legitimacy and power by persuading 
citizens to accept the authority of state acts.150 In some senses, then, 
states are in the act of persuading citizens all the time, for any class of 
treaty. Persuasion treaties are distinct because the chief burden on a state 
is not to persuade its citizens of the rightness or authority of the state’s 
actions, but to ensure that those citizens behave in a particular way.
Why is persuasion necessary? Might a state comply with its interna-
tional commitments simply by issuing regulations with which its citizens 
must comply? As I proposed earlier in this Part, the most obvious meth-
od of state persuasion is indeed regulation, with civil or criminal penal-
ties serving to enforce those regulations. But regulation is not a neces-
sary condition of state compliance with a persuasion treaty: regulation is 
not the only means at a state’s disposal to persuade. The state may also 
persuade through control of privileges, education and public information 
campaigns, and market incentives. 
Nor is regulation a sufficient condition of state compliance. The pow-
er to regulate effectively requires the power to enforce. Enforcement 
power requires consent by the object of regulation. This is true on a con-
ceptual level for all regulations and all regulated entities and, to an in-
creasing degree, on a practical level for all regulations that target power-
ful corporations. 
First, on a conceptual level, all regulations require consent by the ob-
ject of regulation.151 Consider speed limits: states dictate speed limits 
and set penalties for disobedience. Nevertheless, drivers consistently 
disobey. Without some means of convincing drivers to internalize the 
regulatory rules, the rules themselves are incapable of ensuring compli-
ance.152 A state’s enforcement power may assist citizens to internalize 
regulatory rules, but that power is not always sufficient to ensure a 
is the product of persuasive inputs and requires persuasive outputs. While the treaty itself 
may have nominal persuasive powers, this Article does not focus on the persuasive effect of 
the treaty itself. Rather, I seek to home in on persuasive activity by state and private actors 
that explains and affects the success of the treaty. 
150 See Raz, supra note 20 (introducing the “normal justification thesis,” which explains 
that law is authoritative only when citizens accept the authority of its reasons). 
151 See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 102, at 642 (“[P]ersuasion requires acceptance 
of the validity or legitimacy of a belief, practice, or norm . . . .”). 
152 Professor Rebecca Bratspies proposes that regulatory compliance in some cases comes 
from perceptions of regulatory legitimacy, which leads to regulatory trust. See Rebecca M. 
Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 575, 578, 579 & n.16 (2009) (citing Tom R. 
Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 163 (1990), for the connection between perceptions of le-
gitimacy and compliance). 
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course of conduct. Without sufficient enforcement power, a state will 
not be able to alter conduct unless it finds other means to persuade its 
citizens to “buy in” to the regulatory regime. 
Second, and most importantly for our purposes, regulation of power-
ful corporate entities increasingly requires overt consent and participa-
tion by those entities. When the state is charged with regulating the be-
havior of large multinational corporations, which can capture regulators, 
evade enforcement, retaliate for a state’s unwanted regulatory choices, 
and may possess more technical expertise than the state itself, the state 
may not have the capacity to erect and enforce successful domestic regu-
latory regimes.153 In the domestic regulatory arena, the challenges a state 
faces when regulating a transnational corporation are significant. As fi-
duciary duty requirements, corporate charter obligations, and the profit 
maximization imperative prohibit a corporation from acting against its 
economic interests, corporate interests are often aligned against new 
regulatory regimes. A state’s power to coerce corporations to change 
their behavior is often comparatively weak. The state must determine 
which corporate acts it can control when corporations are acting in com-
plex transnational ways; it must avoid capture by industry and powerful 
lobbies, industry associations, and public opinion campaigns; it must ac-
quire technical expertise to rival that of the corporation in order to make 
meaningful rules; and it must enforce any rules it makes, often requiring 
substantial outlays of state capital and manpower. 
As Professor Jody Freeman observed in a seminal article on private 
participation in public governance, in the United States virtually any in-
stance of state regulation “reveals a deep interdependence among public 
and private actors in accomplishing the business of governance.”154 So 
deep is the interdependence that Freeman observes that there is no long-
er such a thing as “purely public” power; rather, public administration is 
a joint venture between public and private entities.155 In Freeman’s ac-
count, the private actors that participate in this venture include corpora-
tions, industry groups, and industry-standard-setting organizations, and 
also public interest organizations and other NGOs.156 Not only are the 
153 See Murphy, supra note 10 (stating that some governments are “unwilling or unable” to 
constrain effectively multinational corporations through regulations). 
154 See Freeman, supra note 21. 
155 Id. at 547–48 (proposing that public administration should be conceptualized as “a set 
of negotiated relationships” between public and private entities). 
156 Id. at 547. 
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participants varied, but the modes of participation are also diverse: pri-
vate actors facilitate regulation at all points in the regulatory lifecycle, 
providing the content of rules, assisting with implementation of those 
rules, delivering services and benefits on behalf of the state, and assist-
ing the state with monitoring and enforcement.157 The cooperation be-
tween public and private actors is so thorough and enmeshed that, rather 
than thinking in terms of a hierarchy of public/private control, Freeman 
proposes that we should instead think of regulation in the United States 
as a process of “shared governance” and “negotiated relationships be-
tween the public and the private.”158
The new cooperative regulatory relationship between public and pri-
vate entities is not limited to the United States. Explicit coregulation has 
become a common feature of the regulatory architecture in Europe as 
well, and recent work traces its emergence in developing countries, 
where it is driven principally by shortfalls in governmental regulatory 
capacity.159
In sum, to regulate effectively, especially when the objects of regula-
tion are principally powerful, monied, transnational corporations, the 
state must rely on the cooperation and collaboration of the regulated en-
tities. 
157 Id. at 547, 551–56 (offering an account of federal reliance on privately generated rules 
governing health, safety, and product standards, and noting that sometimes Congress dele-
gates formal standard-setting authority, and sometimes the delegation takes place informally 
when administrative agencies adopt or defer to privately generated rules). Freeman proposes 
a “contractual metaphor” to explain administrative governance in which public and private 
actors create “both legally enforceable contracts and informal agreements or understand-
ings.” Id. at 571. 
158 Freeman, supra note 21, at 548. 
159 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 209; see also Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of 
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & Soc’y 20–49 (2011) (examining the way public 
and private transnational regulatory regimes complement each other and analyzing the inter-
action according to various models including “hybridization, collaborative law-making, co-
ordination, and competition”); Murphy, supra note 10 (arguing that states often lack capacity 
to make and enforce effective regulations over multinational industry). See generally Tim 
Büthe & Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the 
World Economy (2011) (reviewing the multiplicity of actors that contribute regulatory rules 
and participate in the process of regulation both at the domestic and at the transnational lev-
el).  
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C. Persuasion and Treaties 
At the center of the privatization critique is the observation that in a 
world where corporations wield vast amounts of power, agreements that 
bind only states may be an ineffectual means of coordinating global 
conduct. The response by proponents of private and transnational regula-
tory networks follows rationally from the observations about the nature 
of public/private power outlined in the previous Section: we need to 
move beyond thinking about global governance in terms of explicitly 
top-down regulation and create structures that engage the private sector 
directly. This Article proposes that what the privatization critique sug-
gests in the treaty context is that effective treaty governance will also 
depend upon private-sector persuasion. In other words, when states must 
engage and depend upon the private sector to regulate effectively, then 
effective regulatory treaty regimes will be a product of effective persua-
sion. 
Without domestic persuasion—the capacity to engage the private sec-
tor in coregulation and compliance—a state will either fail to sign on to 
new persuasion treaty regimes or ultimately fail to comply with them. I 
will address these implications in reverse order. 
First, for persuasion treaties that require a state to alter private behav-
ior, a state’s capacity to comply with its international commitments will 
correlate with its power to persuade domestically.160 While the mere ex-
istence of regulations may be sufficient to achieve state compliance for 
persuasive effort treaties (those that are in quadrant D), to achieve suc-
cess with persuasive benchmark treaties (those in quadrant B), the state 
must actually change behavior. For that latter group of treaties, a state’s 
capacity to comply will depend not only on whether it is willing to im-
plement a domestic regulatory regime, but also on the success of those 
domestic regulations. As the previous Section outlined, the success of 
domestic regulations will, in turn, depend on the state’s power to per-
suade citizens to comply through adequate regulatory enforcement or 
other means. 
In addition, a state’s capacity to persuade domestically can also affect 
a state’s willingness to enter into treaties, in two ways. First, as liberal 
international relations theory observes, strong domestic constituencies 
can set a state’s international agenda.161 Thus, if the most powerful do-
160 In benchmark (quadrant B) treaties. 
161 See discussion in infra Section I.D. 
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mestic constituencies do not “buy in” to a set of treaty goals, the state 
will not count itself sufficiently interested in those goals to agree to 
them. 
A state’s capacity to persuade domestically also informs the state’s 
understanding of its capacity to comply, which may affect its willing-
ness to agree.162 Professors Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes 
have proposed that states do not knowingly enter into treaties with 
which they cannot comply. If the Chayes assumption is correct, private 
persuasion is necessary in order to create a treaty to which states will 
subscribe. The assumptions of this Article, however, are more modest 
than those made by Chayes and Chayes. I assume only that a state that 
does not anticipate the capacity to comply with its international promises 
necessarily has only three options: the state may (a) refuse to join a trea-
ty regime; (b) join the treaty without intending to comply;163 or (c) nego-
tiate for weaker or non-binding commitments under that treaty (such as 
agreeing to a treaty in quadrant D, rather than quadrant B).164 None of 
these options lead to strong and successful treaties. 
D. Reciprocal Persuasion 
By identifying persuasion treaties and clarifying a state’s responsibili-
ties under them, the role of private multinationals in treaty making be-
162 See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 19 (proposing that states will not tend to make 
international commitments with which they cannot comply); see also Raustiala, Form and 
Substance, supra note 2, at 595 (“[S]ubstantial evidence indicates that many states try seri-
ously to comply with international law . . . .”). In Professor Louis Henkin’s famous formula-
tion, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time.” Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and For-
eign Policy 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
163 See, e.g., Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 102, at 1940, 1981 (concluding 
that countries with the worst human rights records are among the most likely to join human 
rights agreements); Daniel Vice, Note, Implementation of Biodiversity Treaties: Monitoring, 
Fact-Finding, and Dispute Resolution, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 577, 631 (1997) (noting 
that countries sometimes make environmental commitments “without fulfilling all of the 
treaty obligations, presenting the public image of an environmental commitment without 
having to dedicate resources to implementation”). 
164 Professor Sabrina Safrin notes that another way that countries seek to soften treaty ob-
ligations prior to signing on is by negotiating special legal accommodations for themselves 
that become incorporated into the treaty text. Sabrina Safrin, The Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. 
Exceptionalism, 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1307, 1313–15 (2008) (observing that countries 
sometimes only sign on to treaty obligations after seeking and obtaining “a special or differ-
ent legal norm for themselves”). Because their “special interests [are] expressly accommo-
dated, they can better comply with the norms that they have accepted.” Id. at 1313. 
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comes much clearer: as previous Sections outlined, a state’s capacity to 
comply with persuasion treaties is commensurate with its capacity to 
regulate effectively. As that capacity to regulate slips, treaty making and 
compliance become more difficult, and effective treaty regimes become 
remote. Conversely, as industry aligns its interests with a particular 
regulatory regime, a state’s capacity to enter into and comply with a per-
suasion treaty grows. Thus, persuasion treaties can in some senses be 
understood as products of the interests of both states and private multi-
national entities. To incorporate a robust view of multinational industry 
into our understanding of treaty making and compliance, we need to jet-
tison a view of treaties as products only of state interests. It may be most 
helpful to think of industry and state actors as deeply enmeshed in an 
evolving persuasive relationship that creates or averts the conditions for 
states to agree on treaty texts and comply with treaty obligations. 
Moreover, understanding the conditions for treaty making and com-
pliance in the persuasion treaty arena requires an account not just of 
each single state’s domestic regulatory capacities, but also of the com-
plex global relationships between public and private entities.165 Private 
corporations operate above and below the borders, and the laws, of a 
single state. In many senses the concept of a corporation as confined 
within the control of a single state is outdated. Because corporations are 
transnational, they are elusive. They can suddenly move out of a state 
that attempts to implement new regulations. They can incorporate, pro-
duce, and distribute in separate states, making jurisdiction and regulation 
complex. 
Persuasion runs not just from states to corporations but also from cor-
porations to states. Corporations clearly take an interest in treaty mak-
ing. They lobby governments, attend treaty conferences, hold consulta-
tive status with the United Nations, and refer to treaties for their own 
purposes.166 Private actors sometimes find it in their interest to influence 
165 While treaties are made between states, an increasing diversity of parties participates in 
the drafting and ratification process. See Alvarez, Governing the World, supra note 17, at 
601–02 (noting that international organizations such as the International Labour Organiza-
tion or the World Health Organization sometimes first produce a treaty text, and then present 
it to states for signature and ratification). I propose that some treaties also require the tacit 
acquiescence of private multinational entities. Treaty success depends on whether private 
multinational corporations are prepared to align their interests with treaty ends. 
166 Indeed, multinational corporations often make use of treaties for their own purposes. 
See Affolder, supra note 131, at 160–62 (asserting that corporations refer to treaty standards 
to justify their behavior). Treaties can be useful not only to help reconcile divergent regula-
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international standards and shape international behavior, and so they ex-
ert their power both to clarify new regulatory standards as well as to 
avoid them. Regulatory change can involve chains of responsive persua-
sive moves between industry and state actors. In traditional terms this 
would be both “top-down” and “bottom-up” regulation, but if the part-
ners are no longer in a hierarchical relationship, these concepts are no 
longer useful. Rather, state and corporate actors influence each other in a 
reciprocal cycle. In this new framework, the international agreement is 
the tool of the multinational just as it is the tool of the state. As a corol-
lary, single states now have help from the outside world: persuasion 
jumps across boundaries. State regulatory persuasion is now also trans-
national, with foreign regulations affecting the operations of domestic 
corporations, and the preferences of limited geographic communities 
having a global effect on corporate behavior. 
This analytic framework leaves many questions open for empirical 
study. At what stage in the persuasive cycle will treaties become possi-
ble? How does this vary by state or kind of treaty or type of behavior or 
persuasive tool? The following Part offers some preliminary observa-
tions through a close analysis of a state/industry persuasive relationship 
as it unfolded to produce one of the world’s most successful environ-
mental treaties. 
III. PERSUASION IN PRACTICE: MONTREAL
The Montreal Protocol is widely hailed as the “world’s most success-
ful environmental agreement,”167 and possibly even the world’s most 
successful international agreement of any type.168 It should, however, 
have been a dismal failure. Why was it not? 
tory schemes, but also to clarify a corporation’s responsibilities, which helps industry avoid 
litigation or increased regulation and rewards market leadership. See id. at 161–85 (survey-
ing corporate disclosure statements to find that corporations referred to standards articulated 
in biodiversity treaties to demonstrate their compliance with biodiversity norms and princi-
ples). In fact, “corporations and financial institutions are among the most frequent users of 
the U.N. Treaty Series.” Tully, supra note 58, at 10 (citing U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. 
Decade of International Law, ¶ 209, U.N. Doc. A/54/362 (Sept. 21, 1999)). 
167 Danielle Fest Grabiel, Crucial Crossroads, in Celebrating 20 Years of the Montreal Pro-
tocol, Our Planet, Sept. 2007, at 20, 20–21, available at http://new.unep.org/PDF/OurPlanet/ 
2007/sept/EN/ARTICLE7.pdf.  
168 See C. Boyden Gray, Copenhagen Failure vs. Montreal Success, New Atlanticist Policy 
and Analysis Blog, Dec. 9, 2009, 11:48 AM, http://www.acus.org/print/5994 (quoting Kofi 
Annan as stating that the Montreal Protocol was “perhaps the most successful international 
agreement to date”). 
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A. Montreal Should Have Failed, But Did Not 
The Montreal Protocol mandated drastic reductions of production and 
consumption of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), which erode the strato-
spheric ozone layer.169 At first blush, the Montreal Protocol challenges 
the theory of this Article that persuasion treaties require tacit industry 
consent. The Protocol is a classic persuasion treaty: compliance with the 
CFC limits required regulation by signatory states, and regulation di-
rected to what was, at the time the Protocol entered into force, a “$100 
billion global industry.”170 Moreover, not only is the Montreal Protocol a 
persuasion treaty, it is a quadrant B treaty—that is, a persuasion treaty 
with benchmarks. Specifically, the Montreal Protocol mandated that sig-
natory parties cut their production and use of CFCs by half in a little 
more than a decade,171 and the treaty anticipated domestic regulations 
that would require significant changes in industry practice.172 Thus, the 
Montreal Protocol inhabits the furthest reaches of quadrant B, where 
signatory states take on the greatest burden. 
Two years earlier, the global community had signed a much different 
treaty: the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, which, by all measures, is weak.173 It is a quadrant D persua-
sion/effort treaty, with a mix of binding and nonbinding provisions; a 
managerial framework convention that merely created mechanisms to 
monitor ozone depletion and communicated the general intentions of 
state parties to work together to do something about the problem.174
169 See Grabiel, supra note 167. 
170 Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect 
Stratospheric Ozone, 46 Int’l Org. 187, 187 (1992). The following discussion of the negotia-
tion of the Montreal Protocol draws substantially from Haas’s account, as well as that of Pro-
fessor Detlef Sprinz and Doctor Tapani Vaahtoranta. See Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahtoran-
ta, The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy, 48 Int’l Org. 77 
(1994). I am indebted to Oona Hathaway and Harold Koh for bringing these accounts to-
gether in Hathaway & Koh, supra note 60, at 243–68. 
171 See Haas, supra note 170, at 212 (noting that the Montreal Protocol “called for two 
staggered cuts in consumption that would lead to a 50 percent total reduction from 1986 lev-
els”); Palmer, supra note 49, at 274.  
172 See Haas, supra note 170, at 212, 214–15 (noting the magnitude of CFC reductions un-
der Montreal and constraints on industry). 
173 The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 
Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, 324 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988). 
174 See U.N. Env’t Programme, Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts 
for the Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Lay-
er, Revised Draft Protocol Concerning Measures to Control, Limit and Reduce the Emissions 
of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. 
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What happened in just the two years after the toothless Vienna Conven-
tion to permit the Montreal Protocol’s aggressive commitments and re-
markable success? 
Indeed, the Montreal Protocol is by many measures a success. In con-
trast to the Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol quickly entered 
into force and has enjoyed broad global adherence: a record 197 state 
parties have joined, including significant global actors such as the Euro-
pean Union, the United States, Russia, China, India, and Brazil.175 Later 
amendments to the Protocol made Montreal’s limits even more aggres-
sive, requiring almost complete elimination of ozone-depleting emis-
sions on a rapid timetable.176
Even more remarkable than Montreal’s aggressive limits, or the fact 
that the global community quickly agreed, is the fact that parties largely 
managed to meet their commitments. By 2005, parties to the Montreal 
Protocol had reduced the production and use of all prohibited substances 
to ninety-five percent of 1987 levels.177 Some predict that, due to CFC 
reductions under the Montreal Protocol, the ozone layer will completely 
recover within this century.178 Others point out that Montreal is also, al-
most by accident, the world’s most successful climate change treaty.179
Why? 
UNEP/WG.94/9 (Nov. 14, 1983); see also Palmer, supra note 49, at 274 (noting that the Vi-
enna Convention was successful because rather than requiring states to agree on specifics, it 
established a process and required almost nothing in the way of concrete commitments). 
175 The Protocol opened for signature on September 16, 1987, and entered into force less 
than two years later, on January 1, 1989. U.N. Env’t Programme, Ozone Secretariat, The 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php (last visited Nov. 24, 2012) [here-
inafter Ozone Secretariat]. Some parties ratified the convention after subsequent amend-
ments. See Palmer, supra note 49, at 274–75. 
176 See Palmer, supra note 49, at 274–75 (noting the subsequent agreements made in the 
1990 London Amendments to the Protocol).  
177 See Grabiel, supra note 167, at 20. 
178 See id. at 20–21. 
179 See Barrett, Rethinking Global Climate Change Governance, supra note 15, at 7 (“The 
Montreal Protocol has reduced greenhouse gas emissions four times as much as the Kyoto 
Protocol intended to achieve.”); see also Grabiel, supra note 167, at 20 (stating that Montreal 
is the “world’s most effective climate treaty—reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the 
equivalent of approximately 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide a year between 1990 and 2010, 
and thereby delaying the onset of climate change by up to 12 years”); Gray, supra note 168 
(stating that the Montreal Protocol “produced 10 times the climate benefits of Kyoto and 
could produce several times more greenhouse gas reductions than any post-2012 climate 
agreement”).  
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B. Why Montreal Succeeded 
Because of Montreal’s renown as the world’s most successful envi-
ronmental treaty, there is no dearth of literature probing the reasons for 
its success. Some accounts focus on the evolving scientific understand-
ing of the causes and effects of ozone depletion and resulting public pan-
ic, others on the role of U.S. political leadership, and still others on the 
roles played by the epistemic community or international institutions in 
sharing knowledge and facilitating political bargaining.180 Embedded 
within some of these existing accounts is a compelling story about the 
significance of events that transpired within that $100 billion industry. 
In short, Montreal was successful because industry flipped. 
In the initial stages of the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol, the 
global industry in CFCs was fully against such a treaty.181 After all, a 
strong form of the Protocol (like the one that ultimately entered into 
force) would cut the industry down to half its size.182 Industry lobbied 
behind the position that scientific evidence of ozone depletion was in-
conclusive; it urged that the international community should not take ac-
tion without more evidence.183 The key industry group, the Alliance for a 
Responsible CFC Policy, stated that it “[did] not believe the scientific 
information demonstrates any actual risk from current CFC use or emis-
sions.”184 As both the largest global source and largest global consumer 
of CFCs, the United States became a key player in the Protocol negotia-
tions.185
180 See John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 193, 
194–98 (1999) (collecting explanations); see also Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diploma-
cy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (enl. ed. 1998) (U.S. political leadership); 
Edward A. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy (2003) (international 
institutions); Haas, supra note 170 (epistemic community); Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, supra note 
170 (science); cf. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic 
and International Law, 121 Yale L.J. 252, 321–22 (2011) (highlighting role of trading regime 
that incentivizes compliance by offering certain rights and privileges only to compliant 
states). 
181 See Haas, supra note 170, at 187, 189 (noting that industry representatives initially 
pressed the position that there was insufficient scientific evidence to move forward on a trea-
ty regulating CFCs, and that “American economic interests” cut against such a treaty). 
182 See Palmer, supra note 49, at 274 (noting that the Montreal Protocol required CFC re-
ductions of fifty percent baseline levels). 
183 See Haas, supra note 170, at 194. 
184 Id. at 204.  
185 See id. at 197. 
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At the time of the negotiations, the CFC industry had very few partic-
ipants, and was limited to seventeen companies operating in sixteen 
countries.186 Of these, DuPont, headquartered in the United States, pro-
duced more than twenty-five percent of all CFCs globally, and was the 
only company to provide CFCs in all significant global markets.187
In September 1986, DuPont abruptly broke with its peers and issued a 
statement that concluded “that it now would be prudent to limit world-
wide emissions of CFCs while science continues to provide better guid-
ance to policymakers.”188 Immediately after DuPont reversed its posi-
tion, the United States reversed as well, and less than four months later 
the Montreal Protocol opened for signature.189
C. What to Make of Montreal’s Success 
To say that the Montreal Protocol’s success is the result of DuPont’s 
flip would be a vast oversimplification. Nevertheless, as some of the 
scholarship notes, the circumstantial evidence tells a compelling story: 
After its key industry player acquiesced to the treaty regime, the United 
States withdrew its own opposition. Since the United States was the key 
player in the international negotiations, U.S. support quickly led to glob-
al support. 
To understand the story fully, another piece of the puzzle is needed. 
What explains DuPont’s sudden reversal? Social scientists Detlef Sprinz 
and Tapani Vaahtoranta suggest an answer: DuPont had “initiated a 
large research effort as early as the mid-1970s” to identify substitutes for 
the two primary CFC types, but later discontinued that effort.190 In 1986, 
when the global community began seriously negotiating the Montreal 
Protocol, DuPont restarted that research, and quickly discovered that it 
186 See id. 
187 See id. (noting that DuPont produced fifty percent of the CFCs consumed by the U.S. 
market and operated in North America, Europe, and Japan).  
188 Id. at 205. 
189 See id. at 208–12.  
190 See Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, supra note 170, at 94. Haas credits the epistemic community 
with sharing policy information with DuPont, intimating that DuPont’s change of position 
may have been affected by this information, but does not explain how that information may 
have motivated DuPont to change course. See Haas, supra note 170, at 220. In the end, Haas 
states merely that DuPont’s “decisions [were] made by higher-level executives for diverse 
corporate reasons.” Id. 
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would be able to produce and distribute suitable CFC alternatives.191 The 
Montreal Protocol suddenly fell within DuPont’s economic interest. Be-
cause DuPont’s science gave it a head start in producing CFC alterna-
tives, it could capture market share by becoming a leader in producing 
those alternatives. Indeed, DuPont soon “announced plans to build the 
world’s first commercial-scale plant to produce a substitute” CFC and, 
at the same time, “supported ‘an orderly transition to a total phaseout’ of 
the most harmful CFCs.”192
Professors James Murdoch and Todd Sandler argue that the Montreal 
Protocol was merely a “symbolic” victory: Montreal was successfully 
enacted “because it codified reductions in CFC emissions that polluters 
were voluntarily prepared to accomplish as the scientific case against 
CFCs grew.”193 One of the implications of this, the authors suggest, is 
that Montreal “may be a poor blueprint for other global agreements.”194
I propose the opposite: Montreal is an excellent blueprint for binding 
persuasion treaties because it demonstrates that one means to make an 
effective treaty is to line up stakeholder interests—to persuade—in ad-
vance of the treaty making. Lining up stakeholder interests in advance of 
the treaty making reduces the burden on state parties to alter industry 
conduct afterwards in order to satisfy treaty commitments. 
The Montreal Protocol is a simple example in some ways because the 
industry group over which the Protocol anticipated regulation was small 
and well-defined. Other persuasion treaties will involve constituencies 
that are much larger, more diverse, and for other reasons more complex. 
Climate change accords, for example, involve regulation of a much larg-
er group of stakeholders. Nevertheless, the Montreal Protocol’s simplici-
ty is also a virtue in that it clearly demonstrates the role of the private 
sector in getting a treaty signed and ensuring its effectiveness. 
As proposed in the last Part, the word “persuasion” does double duty. 
If state and industry interests matter to effective multilateral persuasion 
treaties, then, for treaty success, both sets of stakeholders—states and 
private-sector entities—must be persuaded to come on board. Persuasion 
191 See Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, supra note 170, at 94 (stating that DuPont announced that 
those alternatives would be available within five years). 
192 Id. 
193 See James C. Murdoch & Todd Sandler, The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public 
Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol, 63 J. Pub. Econ. 
331, 332 (1997).  
194 Id. at 347. 
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refers not only to the work the state must do to ensure that private indus-
try alters its conduct to satisfy treaty ends; it also refers to the pressure 
industry places on states to regulate or not to regulate. The Montreal sto-
ry suggests that these two persuasive flows may operate together, in a 
reciprocal fashion. 
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta make this point in slightly different terms. In 
their account, two simultaneous “causal chains” led to Montreal’s suc-
cess: “technological advances led to more ambitious preferences for en-
vironmental regulation,” and “public policy . . . force[d] the develop-
ment of more efficient environmental technologies.”195 In other words, 
as industry found CFC alternatives, states were more confident of their 
capacity to commit to aggressive CFC reductions. At the same time, in-
dustry was motivated to find those CFC alternatives precisely because 
they knew that a CFC treaty was likely on the horizon.196 The prospect 
of an international agreement pushed technological innovation, and the 
technological innovation pushed treaty making. Thus, the Montreal Pro-
tocol both contributed to, and was the product of, a reciprocal persuasive 
cycle between public- and private-sector actors. 
The Montreal story thus also suggests that the private-sector support 
required to create an effective persuasion treaty may take place either 
before the treaty comes into force, or after, or both. For treaty success, 
industry must align its interests with state treaty commitments, but it is 
not necessary that industry’s acquiescence happen in a linear fashion— 
through regulation or some other strategy—after the treaty is enacted. 
One compelling explanation for why Montreal became the world’s most 
successful environmental agreement is that the key industry actors dis-
covered an economic advantage to aligning themselves with treaty goals. 
This industry alignment then paved the way for successful domestic reg-
ulatory enforcement. 
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
How does the Article’s descriptive theory help resolve persistent trea-
ty-making problems? Any new concept is a means of simplification, and 
195 Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, supra note 170, at 95. 
196 See id. (“[A]nticipation of a regulatory intervention” gives industry an “incentive to 
search for alternatives for existing products or production methods. . . . [I]ndustry starts pre-
paring itself for more stringent environmental controls by improving the state of abatement 
technology” which “enhance[s] the likelihood of substantive international environmental 
regulation.”). 
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simplification is valuable to the extent that it is useful. In part, the per-
suasion treaty frame is useful to the extent that it inspires and facilitates 
further helpful inquiry. Further analytic inquiry could illuminate the 
borders of the persuasion/resolution distinction and clarify its relation-
ship to a state’s other obligations under a treaty. Systematic empirical 
research could clarify how, when, and to what extent private-sector rela-
tionships or domestic regulatory capacities affect a state’s treaty-making 
and compliance decisions. Even without more elaboration, however, the 
persuasion treaty theory facilitates preliminary conclusions as to how to 
move forward toward more successful treaty making. It does so by di-
viding and ordering the types of problems governments face when mak-
ing treaty decisions, and thus clarifying means of resolving them. 
To excavate and illuminate the normative proposals that flow from 
the persuasion treaty theory, this Part begins with a case study: the 
transnational spread of the European REACH regulations.197 Focusing 
on the REACH regulations may at first appear odd, as the chemical safe-
ty realm is not currently governed by treaty. The REACH story is perti-
nent because it provides a vivid example of how private corporate inter-
ests relate, in a reciprocal fashion, to domestic regulatory success; it 
demonstrates that industry interests are not fixed, but respond to chang-
ing regulatory and social pressures, and suggests the transnational nature 
of the influence that flows among regulators, industry, and civil society. 
The REACH story thus provides clues as to how treaty proponents may 
cultivate corporate cooperation in advance of, or alongside, treaty-
making efforts. After presenting the case study, this Part explores those 
implications. 
A. Charting Corporate Persuasion: REACH 
1. Industry-State Persuasion 
A decade ago, the European Union’s chemicals regulations were 
fragmented and byzantine and, among other failures, imposed impossi-
bly high burdens on public servants.198 In fact, the prior laws were so in-
197 See Regulation 1907/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 De-
cember 2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 396) (EC) [hereinafter REACH Regulations]. 
198 See White Paper, supra note 54, at 6 (reviewing the prior chemical regulations and their 
shortcomings, including a poor “allocation of responsibilities” between public officials and 
industry); see also European Comm’n, Q and A on the New Chemicals Policy REACH, Oct. 
29, 2003, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-03-213_en.htm?locale=en [hereinaf-
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ept that they failed to have any meaningful effect on the production and 
distribution of harmful chemicals.199 So the European Union began to 
discuss adopting an “an ambitious new framework” to regulate chemi-
cals: the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Re-
striction of Chemicals, or “REACH.”200
Global industry actors resisted the proposed European regulations, 
and placed pressure on European Union officials who were considering 
the new policy.201 This first chapter of the story presents a familiar per-
suasive story: industry lobbied governments against socially productive 
regulations that would harm industry. However, the story also shows 
that the means industry uses to do so can include governments (includ-
ing, in this case, high-level U.S. officials) and can reverberate transna-
tionally. 
First, U.S. industry enlisted the U.S. government to assist it in build-
ing a campaign against the E.U. regulations.202 Representatives from 
ter EC Q&A] (stating that the prior regime imposed “lengthy and cumbersome” burdens on 
public authorities in order to issue new chemical regulations). According to the European 
Commission, REACH was proposed because of significant shortcomings in the previous 
regulatory framework, which “has not produced sufficient information about the effects of 
chemicals on human health and the environment, and where risks are identified, it is slow to 
assess them and introduce risk management measures.” Id. 
199 See White Paper, supra note 54, at 6 (noting that “[t]here is a general lack of knowledge 
about the properties and uses of existing substances,” which constitute “99% of the total vol-
ume of all substances on the market”; those substances were not subject to restriction under 
the prior regime). Also, the older regulations privileged older chemicals over newer chemi-
cals, perversely burdening any efforts by the industry to introduce newer, less dangerous 
chemicals. See id. at 5–8. 
200 See EC Q&A, supra note 198; Scott, supra note 87, at 897; see also REACH Regula-
tions, supra note 197. 
201 The information in this Subsection regarding the breadth and depth of the industry 
campaign against the REACH regulations comes from a report prepared for U.S. Representa-
tive Henry Waxman in 2004. Many of the quotations in this Subsection are from primary 
source documents, such as diplomatic cables and government reports quoted in the Waxman 
Report. See Minority Staff of H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Special Investigations Div., A 
Special Interest Case Study: The Chemical Industry, the Bush Administration, and European 
Efforts to Regulate Chemicals 4 (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://oversight-
archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20040817125807-75305.pdf [hereinafter Waxman 
Report]. The Waxman Report had overtly partisan aims—it was meant to expose relation-
ships between the Bush administration and the chemical industry, a key Bush campaign sup-
porter—but helpfully collects original source material to support the story it presents. See 
id.; cf. Thaddeus Herrick et al., U.S. Opposes EU Effort to Test Chemicals for Health Haz-
ards, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at A1 (reporting separately on many of the facts the Waxman 
Report presents). 
202 See Waxman Report, supra note 201, at 3. 
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chemical trade groups met with government officials to express con-
cerns and construct a strategy.203 The State Department, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, the Commerce Department, and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency all became involved.204
To assist the chemical industry, the Department of Commerce pre-
pared a “demarche” to critique the proposed REACH regulations.205 The 
State Department solicited assistance from the chemical industry to “de-
velop ‘themes’ for the U.S. government to use in opposing REACH.”206
Industry officials communicated themes to the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive for Europe, who promised to pass them on to the European Un-
ion.207 The American Chemistry Council also provided various U.S. 
government officials with a study about the effect of the proposed E.U. 
regulations.208 Relying on the American Chemistry Council report, the 
United States issued the demarche to E.U. member states in the spring of 
2002.209 The United States also filed formal comments with the Europe-
an Commission regarding the REACH draft proposal, asserting indus-
try’s theme that the regulations would be “costly, burdensome, and 
complex.”210
Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell also sent two cables to U.S. dip-
lomatic posts.211 The first cable aimed to elicit support from nations out-
side the European Union, directing U.S. diplomats to “raise the EU 
chemicals policy with relevant government officials . . . and the local 
203 See id. at 4. U.S. government officials met “actively” with representatives from the 
“Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA), the American Chemis-
try Council (ACC), the American Plastics Council, ISAC 3, DuPont, and Dow to identify 
industry concerns.” Id. 
204 See id. at ii. 
205 Id. at 5. According to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, the “[U.S.] Office of EU 
and Regional Affairs is working with . . . [the] Office of Chemicals on a demarche to go to 
EU Member States and to important third countries to get this campaign going.” Id. 
206 See id. at 6. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. at 5. According to the Waxman Report, the U.S. government relied entirely on 
the American Chemistry Council to support its critique of the REACH proposal. See id. at 5 
(stating that “[t]here is no evidence in the available documents that the U.S. government per-
formed its own analysis, subjected the draft ACC study to any form of peer review, or oth-
erwise attempted to verify the basis for Secretary Powell’s direction to the diplomatic 
posts”). 
209 See id. at 6. 
210 See id. at i, 14. According to the Waxman Report, these comments critiqued REACH 
and suggested a “multilateral, consensus approach,” adopting the position the chemical in-
dustry had advocated. Id. at 14. 
211 See id. at 5, 7. 
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business community.”212 Powell’s second cable, sent to posts in Europe-
an Union nations, urged U.S. embassy officials to “reiterate to the Euro-
pean Commission and EU Member states our general concerns before” 
finalization of the REACH proposal.213 The cable also included a list of 
arguments recipients could use to oppose REACH.214
A curious feature of this story is that the U.S. government did not 
confine itself to lobbying E.U. government counterparts. Rather, both 
the U.S. government and industry specifically targeted industry, both 
within the E.U. and outside of it, and encouraged foreign industry pres-
sure on E.U. government officials.215 In fact, among the “flood[]” of 
submissions about REACH ultimately made to the European Commis-
sion, industry submissions were the most significant.216
To solicit foreign industry support, U.S. embassy officials met with 
industry officials and advised them to “develop an official position and 
strategy as soon as possible” in order to influence the draft REACH reg-
ulations.217 For example, the U.S. embassy in Greece met with Dow 
Chemical executives “to discuss how to engage the Greek govern-
ment.”218 The U.S. embassy advised Dow to reach out to E.U. col-
leagues, and also coached Dow on which Greek government officials to 
contact and “how best to approach them.”219 Later, the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative for Europe played matchmaker, coordinating an effort 
whereby specific members of U.S. industry in Europe would lobby spe-
212 Id. at 5.  
213 Id. at 7.  
214 See id. at 7–8. According to the Waxman Report, the arguments “reiterated the industry 
‘themes.’” Id. at 7. 
215 See id. at 9. 
216 See Fisher, supra note 51, at 547. For additional accounts of industry pressure on the 
European Union surrounding the issuance of the REACH Regulations, see Jean-Philippe 
Montfort, The Commission White Paper on a Strategy for a Future EU Chemicals Policy: 
The View of European Companies of American Parentage, 23 J. Risk Analysis 399, 399–404 
(2003); Thomas Persson, Democratizing European Chemicals Policy: Do Consultations Fa-
vour Civil Society Participation?, 3 J. Civ. Soc’y 223, 223–38 (2007). 
217 See Waxman Report, supra note 201. 
218 See id. at 6. According to the U.S. Commerce Department, industry representatives in 
Greece and elsewhere advised the United States that “EU Member States and third [party] 
countries [were] largely unaware of this EU initiative and would like the [U.S. government] 
to work to educate them so that they can join the United States in raising concerns with EU 
proposals for this important sector.” Id. at 4. 
219 Id. at 6. At least one other embassy followed suit. See id. at 4. For example, embassy 
officials in Brussels “also met with . . . chemical companies . . . to solicit their views” and 
encourage their participation. Id. 
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cific European counterparts.220 U.S. agencies hosted meetings with Eu-
ropean officials and business representatives, in which the U.S. govern-
ment critiqued the proposed REACH provisions and advocated U.S. 
methods of chemical regulation.221 U.S. agencies also sent staff to meet 
with European industry to urge “active participation in the REACH 
comment period”; arranged videoconferences with E.U. enterprises, 
press, and government officials; submitted articles to chemical industry 
publications in Europe; and briefed congressional representatives travel-
ing to Europe.222 The U.S. government lobbied industry outside of Eu-
rope as well, approaching the Asia-Pacific Chemical Industry Coalition 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Business Advi-
sory Council.223
Both supporters and opponents of REACH recognized the signifi-
cance of the effort by the global chemical industry, assisted and coordi-
nated by the U.S. government.224 The American Chemistry Council 
characterized the industry-based movement as building an “aggressive 
position worldwide,” and lauded the U.S. government action as a “major 
intervention.”225 A partisan report prepared for U.S. Representative Hen-
ry Waxman in 2004 concluded that the REACH lobbying efforts present 
“a case study of how a well-connected special interest can reverse U.S. 
policy and enlist the support of numerous federal officials, including a 
cabinet secretary, to intervene in the environmental policies of other 
countries.”226
2. State-Industry Persuasion 
While global industry lobbying efforts did weaken the REACH pro-
posal, the European Union was nevertheless able to withstand corporate 
220 See id. at 9–10.  
221 See id. at 10. Meetings hosted by the EPA and the American Chemistry Council were 
intended to critique the proposed REACH provisions, to encourage “efficient voluntary 
measures,” and to explain the U.S. approach. See id.  
222 See id. at 11–12. 
223 See id. at 13. The Commerce Department encouraged delegations from the twenty-one 
member states to express their concerns to APEC ministers, and offered to draft “a negative 
economic impact paper, which could be submitted to the EU as APEC collective comments.” 
Id. 
224 For example, European environmental groups noted that “interference by the chemical 
producers in Europe and the US” had a significant impact on the REACH proposal. Id. at 15. 
225 Id. at 15.  
226 See id. at 17.  
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pressure and construct an effective new regulatory regime.227 The new 
regulations came into force on June 1, 2007 and will be fully imple-
mented by 2018.228 As the REACH regulations have gradually come into 
effect, they have become a model of what this Article terms “regulatory 
persuasion”229—whereby the European Union “persuaded” European in-
dustry and those doing business in Europe to comply with regulatory 
ends by refusing to license noncompliant behavior. 
Before moving to the transnational effects of the European regulatory 
persuasion, a brief summary of features of the REACH regulations will 
frame the analysis. The regulatory strategy was innovative, involving 
both a market-based registration requirement and a more traditional reg-
ulatory regime. First, as for registration, the “no data, no market rule” 
requires chemical producers or manufacturers to register chemicals be-
fore placing them on the E.U. domestic market.230 The rule thus imposes 
responsibility on both domestic chemical producers and foreign import-
ers to generate and turn over information about their chemicals.231 To 
register chemicals, producers and importers must submit a “technical 
dossier” that includes information about the chemical, guidance for its 
safe use, a record of any testing of the chemical, and, in some instances, 
a safety report.232 When chemicals are especially dangerous, producers 
and importers have additional reporting burdens.233
227 See id. at 15; REACH Regulations, supra note 197. 
228 See REACH Regulations, supra note 197; see also Fisher, supra note 51, at 543–45 
(tracing the development and implementation of REACH regulations). 
229 When I speak in terms of traditional regulatory persuasion, I am referring to the state’s 
interaction with industry by means of a regulatory mechanism, rather than distinguishing 
between particular regulatory tools. The REACH regime married traditional command-and-
control regulation and the newer market-based mechanisms. The registration process is an 
example of the latter, and the authorization and restriction elements are examples of the for-
mer.  
230 See Fisher, supra note 51, at 544.  
231 See REACH Regulations, supra note 197, art. 5. 
232 See id. art. 10 (outlining the information that must be supplied in a “technical dossier” 
for general chemical registration); see also id. art. 14 (requiring a chemical safety report); id. 
art. 31 (outlining information that must be present in a safety data sheet to accompany the 
chemical throughout its transit in the supply chain). 
233 See id. art. 14 (providing that when chemicals are “dangerous,” or “persistent, bio-
accumulative and toxic,” registrants must complete additional risk testing and provide addi-
tional disclosures); see also id. arts. 31–32 (outlining what information must be present in the 
safety data sheet, and what obligations producers have to communicate information down 
the supply chain); id. arts. 34, 37 (requiring that downstream manufacturers and importers 
communicate up the supply chain about any anticipated uses of the chemical that may alter 
the risk management information in the safety reports). 
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Second, after producers and importers register the chemicals, a new 
European Chemicals Agency (the “Agency”) and E.U. members evalu-
ate them on a rolling basis, beginning with those chemicals identified as 
especially dangerous.234 After evaluation, some chemicals may be re-
stricted or banned.235 Alternately, the Agency and E.U. countries may 
authorize the manufacture and sale of especially dangerous chemicals if 
risks are “adequately controlled” or if the “socio-economic benefits 
outweigh the risk . . . arising from the use of the substance and if there 
are no suitable alternative[s].”236
The REACH regulatory persuasion in Europe thus functioned in sev-
eral ways. First, it placed the burden on chemical industry participants to 
compile information about the characteristics and effects of the products 
they wished to sell. Second, the REACH regulations encouraged indus-
try innovation and competition by threatening to ban unreasonably dan-
gerous chemicals and encouraging the availability of chemical alterna-
tives.237
The European Union is a sufficiently powerful regulator that the 
chemical industry has largely been “persuaded” to come on board. In-
deed, the European Chemicals Agency recently compiled a report on the 
effectiveness of the regulations five years after their implementation, 
and the report states that the regulations “are working successfully and 
the various actors responsible for the work are responding as re-
quired.”238 Notably, the report remarks that to attain full compliance 
with REACH, industry internalization of regulatory rules will be neces-
234 See id. arts. 40–42, 44–45 (providing that the Agency will review testing plans and 
chemical regulation dossiers to check for compliance, and, in concert with member states, 
will identify and prioritize substances with “properties of concern” and subject them to fur-
ther testing according to a “Community rolling action plan”).  
235 See id. arts. 67–68 (outlining the restriction process); id. Annex XVII (listing restricted 
substances and the scope of those restrictions). 
236 See id. art. 60. 
237 See Scott, supra note 87, at 929 (examining how REACH functioned as “competition-
based regulation” and provided incentives for actors in the chemical industry to search for 
alternative substances). 
238 European Chems. Agency, Report Summary 2011: The Operation of the REACH and 
CLP Regulations 2 (June 30, 2011), available at http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/ 
13634/operation_reach_clp_2011_summary_en.pdf. Responding to critics who “feared that 
REACH was too ambitious . . . complex,” and burdensome for industry, the report states that 
though the REACH legislation “set challenging deadlines”—requiring industry to preregister 
large-volume chemicals just eighteen months after the regulations came into effect, then 
complete formal registration and other requirements in 2010 and 2011—“tens of thousands 
of companies” succeeded in meeting those deadlines. Id. 
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sary: “[Success] requires a fundamental change in mindset that is not yet 
fully there. Industry and industrial associations need to continue to pro-
mote this change in mindset if industry is to fully shoulder its responsi-
bilities for safer chemicals.”239
The regulatory persuasion of the REACH regulations leapt state 
boundaries, affecting industry outside Europe as well.240 Social science 
accounts trace at least three mechanisms by which this global influence 
spread.241
First, the regulations created a “nontariff barrier” to trade.242 To com-
pete in E.U. markets, U.S. and foreign producers are required to compile 
and report toxicity data for their products.243 To do this, they must un-
derstand the chain of custody of their chemicals in the European Union 
and how their chemicals will be used in E.U. markets.244 These require-
ments serve as a competitive disadvantage both to companies based out-
side the European Union and to smaller companies that do not have the 
technical expertise to comply with the E.U. requirements.245
Second, the regulations increase information available about the tox-
icity of existing chemicals and possible substitutes for those chemi-
cals.246 Information about chemical toxicity and risk equips global regu-
lators to regulate more effectively; civil society to mount public 
information campaigns exposing the practices of those who use danger-
ous chemicals; consumers to boycott branded products; and private enti-
239 Id. at 3. 
240 Even prior to the implementation of REACH, the REACH proposal was already “af-
fecting U.S. producers, including chemical producers, and . . . doing so along the full length 
of the industrial supply chain.” See Michael P. Wilson et al., Green Chemistry in California: 
A Framework for Leadership in Chemicals Policy and Innovation 61 (2006) [hereinafter 
Wilson Report].  
241 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 51, at 553–55 (tracing the REACH regime’s “inter-
jurisdictional impacts”).  
242 Id. at 554. 
243 See Wilson Report, supra note 240, at 63. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. at 62–64. The Wilson Report observes that the power of the European Union to 
affect U.S. and global producers flows from “the size and wealth of its 25-nation market—
and its capacity to restrict access to that market” on the basis of particular standards. Id. at 
61. 
246 See id. at 61–63; see also Fisher, supra note 51 (noting the significance of the fact that 
the REACH regime will produce information). 
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ties to undertake civil suits.247 The regulations themselves provide a 
“blueprint” for regulatory action elsewhere.248
Third, the regulations catalyze global investment in new chemical 
products. When REACH’s restriction phase begins, the regulations will 
directly spur development of new products by providing market oppor-
tunities for those who introduce less risky chemicals.249 Even in advance 
of that restriction phase, companies are making voluntary shifts to avoid 
the consequences outlined above: regulation, private lawsuits, public 
shaming, and boycotts.250
3. Industry-State Persuasion, In Reverse 
There is another persuasive story here as well, and it reverses the ear-
lier story about industry pressure. Regulators in California, Massachu-
setts, Maine, the U.S. federal government, and China have all proposed 
or enacted regulatory regimes that respond to REACH, and have done so 
247 See Wilson Report, supra note 240, at 63–64 (noting that information facilitates regula-
tion); Fisher, supra note 51, at 554–55 (noting that REACH both provides a “blueprint for 
international initiatives in relation to chemicals regulation” and leads to “contagious diffu-
sion” of regulations and regulatory policy in other domestic jurisdictions); Scott, supra note 
87 (exploring how the REACH regime equipped NGOs both to spread information about 
dangerous chemicals globally and to mobilize consumers to exert various forms of pressure 
on chemicals producers and regulatory officials). 
248 Fisher, supra note 51, at 554 (noting that the “blueprint” functions well at the interna-
tional level but serves as an irritant to policy reform in other jurisdictions because regula-
tions are “embedded” products of “legal and economic cultures”). 
249 See Wilson Report, supra note 240, at 53 (noting market opportunities); see also id. at 
63 (asserting that REACH “will produce global changes in chemical production practices, 
including in the U.S.”).  
250 See, e.g., id. at 63 (noting that “General Electric’s CEO Jeffrey Immelt announced in 
2005 that GE [would] devote $1.5 billion annually to clean technology research and devel-
opment, citing the potential for a U.S. competitive disadvantage with the E.U. in [the chemi-
cals] arena”). A final mechanism of REACH’s influence is the global redistribution of risky 
chemicals. Because the E.U. market is now closed to non-REACH-compliant chemicals, 
companies must either diminish production of those chemicals or increase distribution in al-
ternative markets. In other words, REACH also has the potential to lead to a race to the bot-
tom, perversely incentivizing industry to “dump” noncompliant products elsewhere, where 
regulations are less stringent. See id. at 64 (“The German chemical company BASF . . . will 
continue to produce and sell [DEHP] in the U.S. even though it will be permanently banned 
in the E.U. for use in toys in 2006. BASF will discontinue production of DEHP and its raw 
material, 2-ethylhexanol, in the E.U., where it will introduce a substitute whose safety, ac-
cording to the company, ‘is beyond all question.’”). 
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(at least in part) to respond to the needs of domestic industry constituen-
cies.251
Once the global chemical industry lost its battle to prevent the 
REACH regulations from coming into effect, it became subject to the 
pressures outlined in the previous Subsection, including a changing 
global chemicals market, increased public exposure, and the threat of 
public and private action.252 Suddenly, the chemical industry’s interests 
changed. Industry now needed to enlist regulators to assist it in staying 
competitive in the global market. Regulators began to institute copycat 
regulations not just because they were armed with a European blue-
print,253 but also to protect the interests of domestic industry actors. 
For example, when California began considering a change to its 
chemicals laws, one of its principal reasons for doing so was to respond 
to changing behavior by large U.S. and E.U. companies.254 California 
noted that U.S. industry had responded to “conditions of considerable 
uncertainty” regarding the nature of the chemicals they produce, distrib-
ute, purchase, or use—and the corresponding potential for liability—by 
attempting to produce safer products and “remove hazardous chemicals 
and materials from their supply chains.”255 California interpreted these 
251 See Scott, supra note 87, at 910–20 (California, Massachusetts, Maine, and U.S. federal 
responses); Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Executive Summary, California Green Chemistry Initi-
ative, Phase 1: A Compilation of Options, at xv (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter California Green 
Chemistry], available at http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/pollutionprevention/greenchemistry
initiative/upload/executive_summary.pdf (California response); cf. Zhu Boru, Electronic 
Waste Poses Mounting Challenge, China Daily, Apr. 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/06/content_431666.htm (noting that 
China considered adoption of laws similar to E.U. regulations in the electronic waste arena 
(which constitutes a sister regime to REACH) so that “Chinese companies [would] not be 
squeezed out of the market”). 
252 See Scott, supra note 87, at 920–28; see also Marla Cone, Europe’s Rules Forcing U.S. 
Firms to Clean Up: Unwilling to Surrender Sales, Companies Struggle to Meet the EU’s 
Tough Stand on Toxics, L.A. Times, May 16, 2005, at A1 (noting efforts by U.S. companies 
to comply with the stringent E.U. standards). 
253 See Scott, supra note 87, at 920–28 (examining how the availability of chemical toxici-
ty information enabled NGOs to activate regulatory networks in the United States and to cat-
alyze regulatory travel). 
254 See id. at 910–14 (stating that California was interested “in the implications for Cali-
fornia of chemical policy developments in the European Union”; one of its principal con-
cerns was the economic success of state industries); see also Wilson Report, supra note 240, 
at 63–65 (noting changes in behavior of California chemical industry participants precipitat-
ed by REACH regime). 
255 Wilson Report, supra note 240, at 64; see also id. at 91 (noting that “[m]otivating the 
chemical industry to invest proactively in this transition represents a key, underlying ra-
tionale for a comprehensive chemicals policy in California”). 
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efforts as a demand in the U.S. market for more information on chemi-
cals and safer materials, which California could facilitate through new 
regulations.256
California sought to help its industry actors to avoid the market costs 
of the global shift towards safer chemicals and to capitalize on market 
opportunities.257 A state-sponsored report noted that the state’s “small 
and medium-sized chemical producers” would have trouble preserving 
their access to markets in the European Union, and concluded that a co-
ordinated regulatory approach in California would “assist its businesses 
in meeting REACH requirements.”258 As the California Secretary for 
Environmental Protection put it, “[i]n the absence of a unifying ap-
proach, interest groups and policy makers have been attempting to take 
these issues on one-by-one” in product-specific, chemical-specific, or 
city-specific approaches, with negative market effects.259 California also 
recognized the fact that industry was devoting—and would likely con-
tinue to devote—substantial sums into research and development related 
to safer chemicals, so it sought to capture some of this new investment 
by using regulatory policy to inspire investment in California.260
Finally, California was also persuaded to act to prevent dumping. The 
state-sponsored report noted that companies that were marketing 
REACH-compliant chemicals in Europe were nevertheless continuing to 
256 See id. at xiv–xv. 
257 See id. See generally California Green Chemistry, supra note 251 (justifying new 
chemical regulations in California). 
258 See Wilson Report, supra note 240, at 63. The report explained that “California produc-
ers that fail to act early in meeting the requirements of REACH could face a loss of market 
share and profitability” as they attempt to play “catchup,” and concluded that California pro-
ducers “would benefit from information on alternatives to riskier chemicals that are likely to 
fall under the REACH authorization process”—information that California regulations could 
provide. Id.  
 Among the mounting pressures on industry that the report noted was the regulatory patch-
work or “divergent convergence” problem that currently existed in California, though the 
report raised this problem in a context unrelated to the REACH regulations. See California 
Green Chemistry, supra note 251, at vi (noting problems with a “piecemeal approach” to 
chemical regulation in California). Other commentators recognized that REACH was caus-
ing divergent convergence in various jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wilson Report, supra note 240, 
at 64 (noting that industry was responding to divergent global regulatory schemes by sending 
different chemicals to different global markets); Fisher, supra note 51 (explaining the social 
science concept of “divergent convergence”). 
259 Memorandum from Linda S. Adams, Sec. for Envtl. Prot., regarding California Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (CAL/EPA) (Apr. 20, 2007), in Green Chemistry Initiative, 
supra note 251, at Appendix A. 
260 See Wilson Report, supra note 240, at 63. 
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market noncompliant chemicals in California, a practice which the state 
sought to bar.261
Massachusetts’s interest in regulatory reform in the chemicals indus-
try was also generated in part by the fact that industry was already com-
pelled to respond to the European regime.262 Indeed, an explicit impetus 
for regulatory reform in Massachusetts was the fact that “the European 
Union and other countries have already adopted more restrictive policies 
regarding the use of toxic chemicals and more health protective re-
quirements for products, and over 37% of Massachusetts trade is with 
the European Union’s Member States.”263
Significantly, the U.S. chemical industry’s lobbying position in the 
post-REACH world appears to have changed. In response to an open call 
for comments on California’s new regulatory proposal, the American 
Chemistry Council comments were largely favorable.264 In marked con-
trast to its pre-REACH positions, industry’s comments in California 
proposed only a very modest cabining of the reach of the California ini-
tiative, and they principally served as a self-congratulatory showcase of 
industry’s recent efforts.265
B. Implications 
The REACH and Montreal examples show that industry interests can 
evolve under threat of regulation, as technology evolves, or in response 
to transnational regulatory pressures. The equities are not fixed: as eco-
261 See id. at 64 (noting that California especially sought to avoid the dumping of “1,400 
chemicals that could be presumptively removed from commercial circulation under the 
REACH authorization process”). 
262 See Scott, supra note 87, at 914–15. 
263 Id. at 915. China, in announcing a regulatory regime patterned after E.U. regulations, 
stated that its reason for doing this was to ensure that Chinese industry did not become 
closed out of European markets. See Boru, supra note 251 (stating that China’s regulations 
were patterned after REACH sister regulations concerning electronic waste).  
264 See Memorandum Regarding Information on Chemicals for Clearinghouse, from Mike 
Walls, Managing Dir., Am. Chemistry Council, et al., to Maureen Gorsen, Dir., Cal. Dep’t of 
Toxics Substances Control (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/Pollution 
Prevention/GreenChemistryInitiative/upload/GC_American_Chem_Input.pdf. Admittedly 
the connection between the issuance of the REACH regulations and industry’s apparent 
change of position is highly circumstantial. Tracing whether or to what extent REACH influ-
enced this change would require a complex empirical analysis. 
265 See, e.g., id. at 2 (stressing that the U.S. chemical industry was involved in a major 
voluntary effort to provide information according to global testing standards on commercial 
chemicals that “represent 95% of the chemicals in U.S. commerce by volume”).  
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nomic facts change, state and industry actors often change positions. In 
other words, this is not solely a matter of states seeking socially produc-
tive conduct and corporations opposing it. Corporate influence does not 
always thwart regulatory ends. Rather, corporations can suddenly swap 
sides and support regulations they previously opposed. Corporate regu-
latory influence can operate transnationally and can interact with state 
influence in reciprocal cycles, or a chain of responsive persuasive 
moves, between industry and state actors across national borders. 
These descriptive facts invite further research by those who would 
understand and cultivate conditions for multilateral treaty success. When 
and under what circumstances do corporations flip? What remains is to 
study the mechanics of that change and how to facilitate it.266
Nevertheless, even the preliminary account suggests that the global 
governance tools for manipulating corporate dependencies—such as 
those outlined briefly in Section I.C—may be brought to bear for treaty-
making ends. For the persuasion type of treaty, in other words, propo-
nents should focus their attention on facilitating and capitalizing on do-
mestic private-sector persuasion. This is because although all treaty re-
gimes require potential treaty parties to consider how their accession or 
nonaccession—and compliance or noncompliance—will affect their in-
ternational standing, for a persuasion treaty, a potential signatory state 
must also consider the nature of domestic regulatory relationships. 
The persuasion treaty theory suggests that whether the state will be 
able to enlist the support of relevant private-sector constituents will de-
termine the state’s capacity to comply with the treaty regime, and may 
determine the state’s willingness to sign the treaty in the first place. 
Thus, if corporate stakeholders can influence regulatory success, and 
therefore treaty success, the project for those who would create success-
ful treaty regimes is to align corporate interests with the ends the treaty 
seeks to accomplish. The next Section outlines possible strategies. 
266 Of course, there is much more work to be done. A more systematic analysis could ei-
ther support or challenge the particular features of state/industry regulatory persuasion sug-
gested by the REACH and Montreal examples. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 51, at 553 (not-
ing that “REACH is a distinct departure from other techniques of environmental 
regulation . . . because its role is far more to do with creating the market than just regulating 
it”). 
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C. Proposals 
The discussion in this Section is intended to lay the groundwork for 
strategies that deserve more sustained attention. Because this approach 
to treaty success has not received sustained theoretical attention, howev-
er, even a brief introduction may help guide future analysis. 
As a preliminary matter, persuasion treaty proponents should identify 
the targets of their advocacy and persuasion.267 Those targets are not 
solely governmental decision makers.268 Rather, proponents should train 
their sights on the private-sector companies and industries that will be 
most affected by the proposed treaty regime. Identifying the relevant 
private-sector stakeholders will involve evaluating, globally, (a) how a 
potential treaty will affect various industries and subgroups, and (b) 
which stakeholders within a particular industry or subgroup have the 
most power to alter the course of the treaty. As the persuasion treaty 
theory shows, the relevant stakeholders are those with the capacity to 
shape competition among peers, lobby effectively, employ connections 
with government regulators, or deploy the expertise and enforcement 
power upon which regulators depend. 
To garner private-sector support, states and other proponents can exe-
cute strategies aimed at bringing treaty goals within the business inter-
ests of relevant constituencies. A rich and evolving corporate govern-
ance literature shows how business entities operate within the confines 
of a number of different kinds of “licence.”269 If corporations breach the 
licenses, they face repercussions with economic effects.270 Thus, to bring 
treaty goals within the business interest of relevant private-sector actors, 
states and other proponents should target those licenses. 
As Professor Neil Gunningham explains, business entities are driven 
toward particular agendas based upon external influences from three 
267 Those I call “treaty proponents” may come from all quarters and may include NGO ad-
vocates or other citizen groups seeking to persuade their own government to act; industry 
actors attempting to influence one or multiple potential state parties to adopt a regime; gov-
ernment officials seeking to persuade domestic constituencies; or even governments seeking 
to exert influence on intransigent treaty counterparties. The same basic strategy applies to all 
proponents. 
268 Government officials may also be suitable targets for advocacy—in the United States, 
for example, these officials might be State Department treaty negotiators, the Senate, or oth-
ers in the executive branch—but the focus of analysis and persuasive energy should also in-
clude the private-sector entities that have a stake in how a treaty might change the status quo. 
269 Gunningham, supra note 56, at 481. 
270 See id. 
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principal sources: “economic, legal, and social.”271 These economic, le-
gal, and social influences place obligations on industry actors that might 
be helpfully conceptualized as the “terms or conditions of a ‘licence to 
operate.’”272 Thinking about these various sources of obligation and in-
fluence as “licences”—a term traditionally associated only with the legal 
realm—provides a means to understand how business is affected by a 
broader set of stakeholders beyond traditional regulators.273 Groups of 
stakeholders can extend or cancel the licenses, or privileges, upon which 
the corporation’s success depends.274 In short, “business is dependent 
upon, and has a direct relationship with, the various economic, regulato-
ry and social stakeholders who define, measure and enforce the terms of 
the licence.”275
Just as business entities and government regulators negotiate and in-
teract to shape regulatory rules and structure compliance, so too other 
stakeholders participate in negotiated relationships with corporations.276
Legal, social, and economic licenses are all products of interactive, in-
terdependent, and evolving relationships.277 For example, litigation can 
prompt regulatory change. The existence of regulatory standards, even 
unenforced, can provide fodder for public information campaigns by 
NGOs or shaming by activists. A company’s failure to respond to social 
pressures can prompt regulatory or shareholder responses. Regulations 
in one country can trigger public or regulatory responses in another. Per-
suading corporations to align their interests with treaty goals involves 
making use of these relationships and interdependencies. The REACH 
regulations and events in their aftermath demonstrate such a strategy: 
modifying a legal license (the REACH regulations themselves) modified 
social licenses (public awareness and outcry regarding dangerous chem-
icals) and intercorporate competitive dynamics. These changes altered 
271 Id. (“Economic stakeholders include shareholders . . . banks and customers. . . . Legal 
stakeholders include regulators, legislators and citizens . . . seeking to enforce regulations. 
Social stakeholders include neighbors (the local community), . . . activist organisations and 
the general voting public.”). 
272 See id. 
273 Id. 
274 See id. 
275 Id. 
276 See Freeman, supra note 21, at 548 (suggesting the process of regulation is best con-
ceived as a set of “negotiated relationships”); see also Gunningham, supra note 56, at 481 
(observing that constraints on business entities are set by the expectations of a diverse array 
of stakeholders). 
277 See Gunningham, supra note 56, at 480–81. 
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corporate interests and pushed corporations to modify their conduct in 
socially productive ways. 
Businesses can, and do, engage in socially responsible activities that 
are not immediately profit-maximizing in order to maintain and expand 
their license to operate. The “brave new world of compliance . . . can 
deeply impact [the] survival and prosperity” of multinational corpora-
tions such that “the stakes are simply too high” for officers and directors 
to ignore non-economic constraints on their behavior.278 On the one 
hand, corporations face the risk of litigation and liability in domestic and 
international courts when they fail to meet legal obligations relating to 
human rights, the environment, labor, and corruption.279 On the other 
hand, businesses face nonlegal risks such as “loss of reputation, denial 
of access to foreign markets . . . shareholder dissent,” and bad publicity, 
with its corresponding depletion of stock values.280 Some argue that all 
of these risks place corporate responsibility measures squarely within 
the “business case.”281 Indeed, corporate directors and managers often 
explain corporate social responsibility measures as an attempt by busi-
nesses to reduce risk by anticipating or responding to changes in eco-
nomic, legal, or social expectations.282
The private governance mechanisms surveyed in Section I.C serve as 
a means to capture existing corporate interests in maintaining licenses 
and market share and put them to use to further socially productive ends. 
For example, transparency initiatives and industry standards may en-
courage improved conduct where public exposure would threaten social 
licenses, or may encourage outliers to bring their standards up to meet 
the rest. Treaty proponents should seek to build upon these strategies. 
Doing so takes advantage of the fundamental dependency of corpora-
tions on the social, economic, and legal licenses by signaling to the rele-
vant companies and industries that stakeholder requirements and expec-
278 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 86. 
279 See id. at 335. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 334; see also Gunningham, supra note 56 (noting that companies often justify 
corporate social responsibility measures by providing the “business case”). 
282 See Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 86, at 374; see also Gunningham, supra note 56, at 
481 (discussing risk reduction in terms of economic, social, and legal expectations). 
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tations are changing, or may imminently change.283 Three strategies may 
be particularly effective: 
Regulatory Networking. Corporate opposition may be overcome 
through incremental regulatory migration and networking. Governments 
should seek to craft regulatory regimes that are exportable, and states 
can build global, persuasive capital by contributing to or borrowing from 
the cache of available regulations. States with weak regulatory power 
can borrow from successful regulatory templates elsewhere, with prior 
implementation paving the way. Treaty designers should seek to identify 
and consolidate successes garnered by transnational regulatory net-
works, corporate responsibility measures, and industry standards. 
Transnational Litigation and Public Information Campaigns. Because 
corporations are dependent on legal and social licenses to operate, the 
threat of removal of those licenses is a powerful way to shape corporate 
conduct. Corporate responsibility measures provide a way for industry 
members and groups to prove to government regulators and civil society 
that they are already managing a given problem, and there is no need, 
therefore, for further regulation. Transnational litigation can expose cor-
porate conduct in a way that threatens further regulation and social op-
probrium, and thus the removal of licenses.284 Litigation can also, of 
course, threaten the imposition of damages, and corresponding share-
holder responses. Triggering competition for consumers also motivates 
corporations to change their behavior. Advocates can seek to neutralize 
industry resistance to treaty regimes by putting corporate choices in the 
public eye. Doing so can constrain all three licenses, as consumers and 
shareholders vote with their feet and state regulators gather popular sup-
port for new regulatory regimes. Thus, transnational litigation, corporate 
responsibility measures, and public information campaigns can all serve 
a role in publicizing corporate choices. 
Corporate Law. Corporations have legal status under particular states 
and depend for their existence on legal licenses to operate.285 To put it 
another way, law creates the features of corporations that ensure the 
283 The strategies I offer involve the use of law and target principally the legal license. Fur-
ther interdisciplinary work could be useful in exploring other strategies to target the social 
and economic licenses more directly.  
284 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 12, at 600–24 (presenting several major examples of 
transnational environmental litigation and asserting that even when it is unsuccessful, litiga-
tion can be useful to enhance transparency); see also Hunter, supra note 87 (same). 
285 See Gunningham, supra note 56, at 476–500.  
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scope of their influence; theoretically, therefore, law could also modify 
these features.286
This Article’s principally descriptive account raises sobering norma-
tive concerns. If, as a descriptive matter, corporations are among the ac-
tors whose interests inform the nature and success of multilateral trea-
ties, then the interests of natural citizens—expressed through the 
domestic political system—are diluted. The dilution is particularly sig-
nificant because corporate interests will not always align with the inter-
ests of private citizens. Corporate interests are at heart economic, a fea-
ture that arises from the practical, structural, and often legal requirement 
that corporate officers maximize shareholder value. Since corporations 
are legally barred from performing acts that do not maximize sharehold-
er value, the corporation may not pursue moral or social goods unless 
those goods are economically beneficial, or at least economically neu-
tral.287 Thus, even when corporations engage in corporate social respon-
sibility endeavors, their explanation for these acts is usually economic.288
To begin to remedy these problems, governments could modify fidu-
ciary duty rules, eliminate limited liability for corporate directors and 
officers or extend liability to shareholders, eliminate corporate person-
hood, revoke corporate charters, prohibit corporate electoral contribu-
tions, or strengthen safeguards against corporate lobbying or conflicts of 
interest in government.289 Any of these acts would alter the descriptive 
286 See Danielsen, supra note 10, at 424 (noting that “the structure and decisionmaking of 
corporations” flows out of the corporate law in which the corporation is embedded, which 
varies across jurisdictions, but “is generally concerned with the creation, operation, rights, 
duties, and liabilities of corporations, as well as the rules, structures, and practices that or-
ganize decisionmaking and power within corporations”). 
287 See Gunningham, supra note 56, at 480–81. 
288 See id. at 498 (explaining that corporations engage in corporate social responsibility 
measures as “a calculated response to external pressures” rather than as “an expression of 
any internal moral or philanthropic commitment,” and that they justify their participation in 
terms of risk management). Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests that the dilution of the influence 
of individuals in domestic and thus international law is not significant because it is balanced 
by a corresponding rise in power by NGOs and public officials, who press back on the 
bounds of private power. See generally Slaughter, New World Order, supra note 96. Slaugh-
ter’s account depends, however, on a sufficiently empowered public sector, which my ac-
count challenges.  
289 Credit is due to Gus Speth for many of these proposals. See Speth, supra note 56, at 
167–80; see also Kent Greenfeld & D. Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with Corpo-
rate Law?, 57 Emory L.J. 947, 947–53 (2008) (asserting that modifying aspects of corporate 
law could reduce externalities and ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth). See gen-
erally Progressive Corporate Law (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (reviewing debates over 
whether corporate officers and directors do, or should, have responsibilities to attend to so-
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facts that contribute to corporate pressure on domestic regulatory sys-
tems and, as a result, on international agreements. These proposals may 
appear more unrealistic than they are. In the United States, for example, 
several states have modified laws of incorporation to permit “benefit” 
corporations that may deviate from the fundamental object of maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth in order to pursue socially or environmentally re-
sponsible ends.290
CONCLUSION
For some treaties, such as a global climate change accord, the obsta-
cles to treaty making and enforcement seem more intractable than ever. 
Yet the business of non-treaty governance is booming. A multitude of 
new mechanisms compete for the allegiance of global corporate powers. 
Private, NGO-sponsored, or quasi-public corporate responsibility plans 
throng one side of the field, and traditional and transnational regulatory 
measures occupy the other. And progress on important global problems 
ensues: corporations, sensitive to the threats of public censure, competi-
tive failure, ballooning regulations, and transnational legal repercus-
sions, engage actively in both designing the terms by which they will be 
governed and demonstrating the appropriate compliance. 
Treaties, however, are not obsolete. Even the staunchest proponents 
of the new governance mechanisms recognize that they are constructed 
within, and structured by, the traditional international law system.291
Moreover, as corporations are incapable of acting against their economic 
interests, voluntary and soft-law plans are inherently limited. Finally, in 
our newly interdependent and resource-limited world, some global prob-
lems will be solved by nothing less than full international agreement. 
Identifying obstacles to effective treaty making in beleaguered areas—
and the means of resolving them—remains imperative. 
cial goods beyond profit maximization); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and 
the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1373 (1993) (same).  
290 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organiza-
tion?, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 591, 594 (2011) (identifying these states as Hawaii, Maryland, 
New Jersey, Vermont, and Virginia). 
291 See Alvarez, Interliberal Law, supra note 12, at 250; see also Shelton, supra note 13, at 
322–23 (examining the state of international law at the end of the twenty-first century, and 
observing that new nonlegal ways of shaping global affairs can be effective to solve some 
problems, and can lead to traditional international law, but that traditional international law 
is nevertheless indispensable). 
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This Article offers an analytic structure that (a) clarifies which treaties 
are most directly subject to the challenges of private-sector influence, 
(b) identifies the sources of the problem, and (c) offers suggestions as to 
how to resolve it. The structure rests on two premises. First—and build-
ing upon important insights by others about the nature of public/private 
regulatory relationships—states cannot effectively regulate without the 
consent and participation of affected industries. Second, there is an im-
portant category of treaties whose content, success, and very possibility 
depends upon solving the problems of domestic regulation. The conclu-
sion follows: without solving domestic regulatory problems by enlisting 
the consent and participation of relevant private parties, important regu-
latory treaties will fail to materialize, or fail to garner success. I have at-
tempted to identify and distinguish the relevant treaties, and to suggest 
some of the instruments we have in our toolbox to secure private con-
sent. Among other tools, we find the plentiful set of global governance 
mechanisms that champion direct engagement with the private sector. 
Future attention should be paid to how these and other mechanisms play 
a role in facilitating the functioning domestic regulatory regimes that en-
sure persuasion treaty success. Because persuasion treaties are indispen-
sable, guarding against their failure is imperative. 
